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Abstract 
 
 
The thesis explores the possibilities and barriers of making the Russian Baltic exclave, 
Kaliningrad, a “pilot region” for cooperation between the EU and Russia. By analysing 
Kaliningrad’s political-geographic status as both Russian exclave and EU enclave, it is argued 
that Kaliningrad is influenced by the territoriality of the EU as well as the territoriality of Russia, 
and that development in Kaliningrad is depending on alignment of the EU and Russia’s 
territorial strategies in general and towards Kaliningrad in particular. The analytical focus is then 
turned towards the EU and Russia’s overall cooperative framework – the so-called “four 
Common Spaces” – which lay down the guidelines for the EU and Russia’s long-term territorial 
rapprochement strategy in order to respond effectively to common territorial and non-territorial 
challenges. By analysing existing programs and initiatives in Kaliningrad and their connection to 
Kaliningrad’s territorial status in the EU-Russian relationship, it is argued that the development 
in Kaliningrad would benefit from being tied up to the framework of the “four Common 
Spaces”. This implies to agree on a new policy designed to invest in Kaliningrad’s “attachment” 
to the EU instead of compensating for Kaliningrad’s “detachment” from the Russian mainland. 
The thesis thus concludes that Kaliningrad can become a “pilot region” for cooperation between 
the EU and Russia within the framework of the “four Common Spaces”, and it is suggested: 1) 
that Kaliningrad becomes Russia’s “pilot region” so that Russian sovereignty is preserved; 2) 
that Kaliningrad is given preferential treatment, which take into account the region’s particular 
political and geographical situation and challenges; and 3) that the EU and Russia jointly agrees 
on an agenda, which defines the guidelines for the development in Kaliningrad. That way 
Kaliningrad can become a common space for the EU and Russia and lead the way for the 
overall cooperative framework between the EU and Russia. 
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Resumé (Danish) 
 
 
Specialet undersøger muligheder og barrierer for at gøre den russiske Østersø-eksklave, 
Kaliningrad, til ”pilot region” for samarbejde mellem EU og Rusland. Gennem en analyse af 
Kaliningrads politisk-geografiske status som både russisk eksklave og EU enklave argumenteres 
der for, at Kaliningrad påvirkes af både EU's territorialitet og Ruslands territorialitet, og at 
udviklingen i Kaliningrad derfor afhænger af, at EU og Rusland afstemmer deres territorielle 
strategier i almindelighed og overfor Kaliningrad i særdeleshed. Det analytiske fokus rettes 
dernæst mod EU og Ruslands overordnede programsamarbejde – de såkaldte ”fire fælles rum” – 
der udstikker retningslinierne for EU og Ruslands langsigtede territorielle tilnærmelsesstrategi og 
tilsigter at håndtere fælles territorielle og ikke-territorielle udfordringer. Ved at analysere igangvæ-
rende initiativer i Kaliningrad og deres relation til Kaliningrads territorielle status i forholdet 
mellem EU og Rusland fremføres det, at udviklingen i Kaliningrad med fordel kan videreføres 
indenfor rammerne af EU og Ruslands ”fire fælles rum”. Dette indebærer at vedtage en tilgang, 
der investerer i Kaliningrads ”tilknytning” til EU frem for at kompensere for Kaliningrads 
”adskillelse” fra Rusland. Specialet konkluderer, at Kaliningrad kan blive ”pilot region” for 
samarbejde mellem EU og Rusland indenfor rammerne af de ”fire fælles rum”, idet der 
anbefales: 1) at Ruslands suverænitet opretholdes, og at Kaliningrad bliver Ruslands ”pilot 
region”; 2) at Kaliningrad begunstiges af særlige privilegier, der tager højde for regionens særlige 
politisk-geografiske situation og udfordringer; og 3) at EU og Rusland i fællesskab vedtager en 
dagsorden, der udstikker fælles retningslinier for udviklingen i Kaliningrad. Derved kan 
Kaliningrad blive ét fælles rum for EU og Rusland og vise vejen for det overordnede 
programsamarbejde mellem EU og Rusland. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
In April 2001, the former EU commissioner for external relations, Christopher Patten wrote an 
article in the British newspaper “The Guardian” under the heading “Russia’s hell-hole enclave” 
(Patten, 2001). In the article Patten introduced the small Russian oblast1 Kaliningrad as one of the 
key-issues in the EU’s relations with Russia prior to the EU enlargement. Kaliningrad was 
sandwiched between the two candidate countries, Lithuania and Poland, and their prospect of 
joining the EU in the near future raised a number of questions concerning the presence of a 
Russian exclave “inside” EU territory. While stressing the beneficial consequences of EU 
enlargement for all the involved parties (including Russia), Patten identified two aspects of 
Kaliningrad’s geographical location, which should be carefully considered. First, the admission of 
Lithuania and Poland in the EU would have an influence on the movement of people and goods 
in and out of Kaliningrad. Until then, the citizens in Kaliningrad could relatively easy move 
across both Lithuanian and Poland territory on their way to “mainland” Russia, but when 
Lithuania and Poland where included in the EU, the visa regime would have to be regulated. 
Second, and that is what Patten referred to in the heading of the article, Kaliningrad where 
suffering under a considerate degree of pollution; drug and health problems; organised crime; as 
well as pervasive socio-economic problems. Patten argued that there was a risk that these 
problems “inside” Kaliningrad could spread to the aspiring EU members “outside” the borders 
of Kaliningrad – and thus the EU as a whole. Altogether, there was a need for a strengthened 
dialogue between the EU and Russia in order to overcome these challenges.  
  
Indeed, the challenges faced by the EU and Russia regarding Kaliningrad were serious. From a 
formal geographical perspective Kaliningrad were soon to be located “inside” the EU and 
“outside” Russia, while from the perspective of political and jurisdictional sovereignty, the 
Russian oblast would remain “inside” Russia and “outside” the EU (Fairlie, 2001:13). Not only 
did this affect nearly one million people living in Kaliningrad (plus their relatives in Russia) when 
they were to travel back and forth between mainland Russia and Kaliningrad, but in addition the 
presence of a Russian region inside the EU raised the delicate issue of sovereignty on the agenda. 
                                                 
1 Oblast is the term for a Russian administrative unit one step below the national level. Russia is divided in 89 so-
called federal subjects, which again is broken down into 21 republics, 6 territories (krajá), 49 provinces (oblast), two 
cities (Moscow and Saint Petersburg), one autonomous Jewish province and 10 autonomous districts (okrug).  
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This was not just the case for Russia, whose sovereignty would be somewhat restricted by the 
EU as people and goods could not move freely from one part of Russia to another. The 
politicians of Lithuania were also concerned whether the agreement between the EU and Russia 
would restrict Lithuania’s sovereignty. Especially, suggestions about a Russian corridor through 
Lithuania helped to fuel Lithuanian concerns. Additionally, as Patten pointed out in his article, 
so-called “soft security” threats stemming from Kaliningrad could violate the territorial 
sovereignty of the EU because pollution, organised crime etc. are not confined by territorial 
borders and therefore could have a direct impact on the EU internally. Obviously, neither the 
EU nor Russia was comfortable with a situation where they were reliant on the other party’s 
decisions and the basis for negotiation where undeniably complicated.2 As such, Kaliningrad 
accentuated territorial questions of an almost ontological character, which point towards a strong 
relation between politics and geography. That is to say that the principle of territorial sovereignty 
is considered as the cornerstone in the prevalent perception of the modern territorial state, and 
state leaders normally hesitate to engage in negotiations if there is just the slightest risk of 
infringing state sovereignty.  
 
During the Danish EU presidency in 2002, when the framework for the EU enlargement was 
negotiated, the parties managed to agree on a compromise on “the Kaliningrad-problem”. The 
compromise achieved in the EU-Russia Joint Statement thus recognised Kaliningrad as an 
integral part of the sovereign Russian Federation, while outlining the future arrangements for 
transit between the oblast and Russia in the so-called Facilitated Transit Document (FTD) and 
the Facilitated Rail Transit Document (FRTD), which, as their overall objective, outlined an 
acceptable and uncomplicated solution to the transit problems (EU & Russia, 2002). The 
agreement furthermore preserved the sovereignty of Lithuania and Poland (i.e. Kaliningraders 
would need to apply for visas in order to travel to mainland Russia, and perhaps more 
importantly Lithuanian and Poland authorities could reject permission). Finally, the agreement 
guaranteed that none of the regulations would affect Lithuania and Poland from participation in 
Schengen3 as well as the Joint Statement committed the parties to support the development of 
                                                 
2 The basis for negotiation is described in the “Communication from the Commission to the Council “Kaliningrad: 
Transit”” (Commission of the European Communities, 2002). 
3 The Schengen Agreement from 1985 stipulates a common policy on the entering of persons into the territory of 
the member countries as well as a common border system. Furthermore, border control between the Schengen 
member countries has been removed and a common Schengen visa allowing access to the area has been introduced. 
Currently, 15 countries have signed the Schengen Agreement – including non-EU members Iceland, Norway and 
Switzerland.  
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Kaliningrad financially and technically and strengthen cross-border cooperation. Russia accepted 
the agreement, perhaps because they did not have a choice, since the enlargement seemed 
inevitable at that stage. On the other hand, the mutual commitment made by the EU and Russia 
to support the economic development in Kaliningrad and strengthen cross-border cooperation 
offered Russia some “compensation”, which made Russian President Putin characterise the 
agreement as: ”not ideal, but acceptable” (Putin, 2002). Even though the substance in the 
agreement could hardly come as a surprise, the negotiations and the agreement showed that the 
EU and Russia have a common interest in Kaliningrad, and that both parties are willing to oblige 
to the interests the other part. In other words, “the Kaliningrad-question” was a successful test 
for finding common solutions to common challenges.  
 
Since the enlargement, “the Kaliningrad-question” (or “the Kaliningrad-problem” as it is often 
referred to) has been more or less absent form the EU-Russian agenda. The transit regulations 
run rather smoothly, and the EU’s support to Kaliningrad is maintained through the EU’s 
Northern Dimension Initiative (NDI), while Russia most recently has extended Kaliningrad’s 
status as Special Economic Zone (SEZ) thereby encouraging foreign investors to engage in 
Kaliningrad. Furthermore, the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) have initiated different 
programmes with the purpose of strengthening cross-border cooperation.  
 
Meanwhile, the EU and Russia have concentrated on the ambitious four Common Spaces as the 
primary focal point in their dialogue. The four Common Spaces covers cooperation within the 
areas of economic issues and the environment; issues of freedom, security and justice; external 
security, including crisis management and non-proliferation; as well as research and education, 
including cultural aspects. Interestingly, several of the topics dealt with in the context of the four 
Common Spaces are identical to the “problems” concerning Kaliningrad (e.g. pollution, trade 
barriers, visa-regulations, fight against drugs and trafficking in human beings etc.), and many of 
the identified “solutions” have already been tested in Kaliningrad in various ways in the context 
of the NDI and the CBSS. This goes for combating organised crime; cross-border cooperation 
within the fields of research and development; education; and the environment. That way, 
Kaliningrad can be seen as a “micro cosmos” for the agenda set by the four Common Spaces. 
The only notable exception is the issues belonging under the third “Space”, which covers 
external relations such as international terrorism; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; 
and the role of the UN, the OSCE and the Council of Europe.  
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 However, the overall framework laid out in the four Common Spaces does not treat Kaliningrad 
as anything else than a part of Russia. Consequently, the Russian proposal about turning 
Kaliningrad into a pilot region for cooperation between the EU and Russia seems to be off the 
agenda. This idea was originally launched by Russia in 1999 in the so-called “Medium-term 
Strategy towards the EU” (Russian Federation, 1999), but even though the proposal seemed 
ambitious and forward-looking, it never substantiated in concrete initiatives. There are many 
suggestions why the proposal did not bring about any results. On the one hand, Kaliningrad was 
shown little attention from the EU at that time, since other issues were given a higher priority – 
not least the Baltic Sea Region in general and the future of the three Baltic States in particular. In 
other words, it was not the time to engage in difficult negotiations with Russia. On the other 
hand, some suggest that Russia got cold feet, as they realised that the proposal could divide the 
Russian jurisdiction in two, if Kaliningrad were allowed to “approach” the EU, or – even worse 
– Kaliningrad could be tempted to pursue independence, which potentially could inspire other 
parts of Russia to do the same (Holtom, 2002). Nevertheless, the proposal has been quietly 
forgotten by both EU and Russian diplomats.  
 
As indicated above, the territory of Kaliningrad has a number of characteristics, which makes the 
Russian oblast particularly interesting in the relationship between the EU and Russia as well as in 
the context of the four Common Spaces. It would therefore be of interest to test the feasibility 
of making Kaliningrad a pilot region for the four Common Spaces. From a practical perspective 
this seems obvious. First of all, we are dealing with a region whose problems are relevant for 
both the EU and Russia. Secondly, it could be relevant to test the viability of the comprehensive 
cooperative framework in a smaller scale. After all, implications of implementing the four 
Common Spaces are far-reaching, since we are dealing with two extremely complex and diverse 
actors. In order to explore the abovementioned more thoroughly, the following research 
question will guide the study: 
 
How can the Kaliningrad Oblast become a pilot region for cooperation within the 
framework of the four Common Spaces between the European Union and the Russian 
Federation? 
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A few comments about the character of the research question should be made at this stage. First 
of all, the study deals with is a problem concerning strategic planning. This type of research 
questions is a way of analytically confronting a social phenomenon or problem, where there is a 
lack of knowledge with the purpose of suggesting appropriate solutions (Olsen & Petersen, 
1997:30ff.). As such, this study is concerned with Kaliningrad’s status in the relationship between 
the EU and Russia – more specifically in terms of exploring the possibility of making Kaliningrad 
a location for cooperation between the EU and Russia within the framework of the four 
Common Spaces. As already pointed out, and as will be further analysed in the following 
chapters, Kaliningrad is a geographical peculiarity squeezed in-between the territories (and 
territorialities) of mainland Russia and the EU. As a consequence, there are a number of special 
territorial issues concerning Kaliningrad, which are given attention by both Russia and the EU. 
The common denominator for these issues is often referred to as “the Kaliningrad-problem”. 
Thus, Kaliningrad’s location “inside” the territory of the EU and “outside” the Russian mainland 
is considered to be a problem (or, at least a challenge) in EU-Russian relations and for that 
reason solutions, in terms of strategic planning, are called upon. That is the point of departure for 
the present study.  
 
1.1. Terminology 
As regards to the terminology used in the research question and elsewhere in the thesis, a 
clarification is needed. First of all, in the research question I am using the term “Kaliningrad 
Oblast”, which refers to the territory of the Kaliningrad region. However, for matters of 
convenience, I will refer to the oblast as “Kaliningrad” in the following (as I did in the 
Introduction). I am specifically pointing this out, since Kaliningrad is normally referring to the 
regional capital.  
 
Secondly, I am referring to the four Common Spaces in the research question. The four 
Common Spaces are best characterised as an agenda for cooperation between the EU and Russia 
and constitute the cooperative framework between the EU and Russia. As such, the Common 
Spaces do not lead to cooperation by themselves, as they are reliant on respectively the EU and 
Russia to make them functional. Roughly speaking, the four Common Spaces are merely a 
declaration of intent, which has later been made operational in the “Road Maps for the 
implementation for the creation of the four Common Spaces” (EU & Russia, 2005). The Road 
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Maps define the detailed targets for each of the four Common Spaces as well as they set out the 
plans of action in terms of realising the Common Spaces. As such, the Road Maps make up the 
terms of reference for cooperation between the EU and Russia for the medium-term. When I am 
using the term “the four Common Spaces”, I am thus referring to the “Road Maps for the 
implementation for the creation of the four Common Spaces”. 
 
Third and finally, the research question operates with the term “pilot region”, which also requires 
some explanation. The idea of turning Kaliningrad into a pilot region was, as pointed out earlier, 
first introduced by the Russian authorities in 1999 in the “Medium-term Strategy towards the 
EU” (Russian Federation, 1999). Even though the idea was only a subordinate clause, it has been 
given much attention – especially in academic forums.4 The term was not in any way concretised 
in the Medium-term Strategy, and the speculations about the possible content of Kaliningrad as a 
pilot region thus assumed a wide variety of characters, since the idea remained open for 
interpretations.  
 
From the perspective of this study, the term “pilot region” could just as well have been replaced 
by ”test region”. However, since the debates about Kaliningrad traditionally use the term pilot 
region, I choose to do the same, so that the terminology corresponds with the existing debate. 
“To pilot” means to lead or guide the course of something/someone. For example, in television 
the term “pilot episode” is often used to describe an episode of a television program, which is 
showed to producers and companies in order for them to get an idea of the type and character of 
a proposed program. As such, on the basis of the pilot episode the audience decides if it would 
be a good idea to broadcast the program in a proposed series of many. The pilot episode thus 
establish the basis for the decision, since it guides the audience’s expectations about what the 
series of programs would be like in terms of script, actors, characters, genre etc.  
 
If we adopt the same description to a region, we get a territorial defined area that is assigned with 
a number of specific characteristics (i.e. regional development schemes, cooperative initiatives 
etc.) in order to generate a detailed picture of any obstacles and/or potentials. A pilot region is 
thus first and foremost referring to a territorially defined area that can show barriers and 
possibilities about a specific problem or challenge in a specific context. As such, a pilot region is 
                                                 
4 See for example Holtom (2001), Burkhart (2005), Medvedev & Ignatyev (2005), Smorodinskaya (2001).
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to be considered as a territorial case study that examines a problem or challenge – in this case the 
challenge of cooperation between the EU and Russia. 
 
1.2. Structure of analysis 
In order to explore the abovementioned research question, I will start out in chapter 2 by 
introducing to the theoretical terminology used – specifically by discussing the concepts territory 
and territoriality. These two concepts will help us to clarify the peculiar characteristics of the 
territory of Kaliningrad. As we will see, Kaliningrad is indeed a special territory – not least from 
the perspective of the traditional understanding of territories, which are primarily focusing on the 
territorial state as the archetype. Furthermore, I will analyse the significance of Kaliningrad 
geographical location in terms of making the region a pilot region for cooperation by looking at 
Kaliningrad’s dual status as Russian exclave and EU enclave. 
 
In chapter 3, I will continue with an analysis of the territoriality of the four Common Spaces. In 
order to do so, the chapter will provide a brief introduction to the cooperative framework 
between the EU and Russia. Furthermore, the four Common Spaces will be compared with the 
territoriality of the EU, which is one of the most far-reaching responses to the challenges facing 
territorial states today. As such, the chapter is designed to elucidate the ideas and fundamental 
objectives in the relationship between Russia and the EU.  
 
Chapter 4 draws the focus more specifically towards the empirical conditions in Kaliningrad with 
the intention to analyse the specific characteristics of the territory of Kaliningrad. Hence, in this 
part of the analysis I will turn the attention towards examples of existing and on-going projects 
and initiatives in Kaliningrad, with relevance for the agenda set out by the four Common Spaces. 
The chapter will show that Kaliningrad is already engaged in a wide variety of activities, which 
might as well could have been parts of the implementation of the Common Spaces.  
 
On the basis on these findings, I will then proceed to chapter 5 where the main conclusions from 
the previous chapters will be discussed. The outcome of this discussion will subsequently provide 
the basis for the final conclusion in chapter 6, where the aforementioned research question is 
answered.  
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2. Territories, Territoriality and Kaliningrad 
 
 
Discussions about the location of Kaliningrad and its status in the relation between the EU and 
Russia often focus on the oblast as a problem (cf. Patten, 2001). Undeniably, Kaliningrad poses a 
challenge in relations between the EU and Russia, as both have an interest in the development in 
Kaliningrad, which was exemplified by the compromise in 2002 (see chapter 1). This common 
interest is accentuated by Kaliningrad’s geographical location “outside” the territory of Russia 
and “inside” the territory of the EU. The present chapter will analyse the implications of 
Kaliningrad’s geographical location by adopting a theoretical approach, which looks at territories 
as social constructs that are produced and maintained by social processes of struggle and/or 
negotiation. As such, territories are not historical facts, but rather outcomes of social practises 
and power struggles. 
 
The chapter will start out by introducing the concepts of territory and territoriality, since the 
meaning of these concepts as well as the use of them can help to provide a better understanding 
of Kaliningrad and elucidate why both the EU and Russia have an interest in the oblast. 
Furthermore, the concepts of exclave and enclave are scrutinised, as these concepts help to 
understand Kaliningrad’s double dependence on “external powers”. 
 
2.1. Territory and Territoriality 
The etymology of the word “territory” is unclear and suggests a rather ambiguous term. 
According to Oxford English Dictionary (OED), territory derives from the Latin noun “terra”, 
which refers to “land” or “earth” (OED, 1989:819). However, the OED also suggests that 
territory decent from the verb “terrere”, which means “to frighten”. This corresponds with the 
way territory is used in the field of biology – namely as an area occupied by a single animal or 
group exercising a certain pattern of behaviour in order to defend the area against intruders 
(especially those of the same species). The duality of the word’s origin is somewhat encapsulated 
in “territorium”, which refers to “the land around a town, a domain, district” (ibid.), since this 
definition operates with both occupying (domain) and territory (land). Accordingly, the 
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etymology of territory entails both practise and product, and thus implies a degree of duality, which, 
as we will see below, is encompassed by the theoretical concepts of territoriality and territory.  
 
John Agnew describes territory as occupied space (Agnew, 2000:824). What is interesting in this 
definition is the element of occupation, which implies that territories involve an aspect of power, 
where something is included and something is excluded. Territory should accordingly be 
understood as the outcome of a social process of negotiation or struggle, where certain attributes 
and meanings are associated to space, while others are not. This implies that social space is 
strongly associated with social action, and that territories are social processes (Paasi, 2003:110). 
The linkage between social space and social action is encompassed in the notion of territoriality, 
which describes the practises that produce territories. The most common definition of 
territoriality comes from Robert D. Sack, who defines territoriality as: 
 
 “The attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, 
and relationships, by declining and asserting control over a geographic area” (Sack, 1986:19).  
 
What Sack suggests is that a fundamental aspect of spatial organisation is the affiliation between 
space and social practises, where the latter assigns meanings to the former with the purpose of 
exercising control. Sack’s point of departure is therefore that territories are manifestations of 
power, which is what makes territories distinctive from other types of places. This is in line with 
John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge who from a general perspective notes that: 
 
“Geography may “matter”, but only as the moment in which abstract universal social 
processes, such as social stratification, state-building, and ideological hegemony, are revealed 
in space” (Agnew & Corbridge, 1995:13). 
 
By analysing these geographical manifestations of power, territories are thus revealed as 
historically contingent and socially constructed, and – more importantly – as dynamic and 
changeable entities, which are important elements of social organisation. 
 
Following the above definition, territories can encompass everything from a football field to the 
territorial state – or, at an even larger scale, the EU. If we look at the territoriality of a football 
field, it has a number of specific features attached. It is a horizontal lawn with two goals. It is 
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shaped rectangular and demarcated with chalk lines and corner flags. Furthermore, certain rules 
of appropriate behaviour are connoted with the field and failing to obey to these rules can lead to 
sanctions e.g. exclusion from the field. Altogether, these attributes (along with numerous others) 
make up the territory of a football field. The point is that the space is not something in itself. It is 
not a football field, but it becomes a football field as it is occupied with meanings and signs, which 
also means that it may loose some of its territoriality between matches. As pointed out by 
Knight: “territory is not; it becomes, for territory itself is passive, and it is human beliefs and 
actions that give territory meaning” (Knight, 1982:517). From this line of thought it is also 
evident that time is an important factor, since the territory was something else before it became a 
football field. This means that if the characteristics of a football field are not repeatedly 
communicated (e.g. by athletic associations, the media etc.) people cease to recognize and obey 
to the distinct territorial features, and the field will loose its connotations and is thus able to have 
other meanings allotted (e.g. a public park equipped with signs telling the public to “keep off the 
grass”).  
 
If we for a moment return to Sack’s definition of territoriality, there are three interrelated facets 
of territoriality (Sack, 1986:28)5. First of all, territoriality is a classification by area – contrary to 
classification by kind. A military area could exemplify this, as outsiders are prohibited from 
entering because of anti-spy provisions such as forbids against taking photos. Hence, instead of 
letting outsiders enter as long as they do not use their cameras (classification by kind); the area is 
restricted for outsiders in order to avoid photos of the area, which means that the area is used to 
control the behaviour (classification by area). Secondly, territoriality involves some form of 
communication. The element of communication is important in the sense that it establishes 
boundaries. A boundary can assume both physical and symbolic forms as some state borders are 
manifested by fences and border guards (e.g. EU’s external borders), while others only are 
marked by a flag or a sign telling you that you are entering another country (e.g. the Schengen 
Area). Furthermore, boundaries can be “internal” within territories such as American buses and 
restaurants in the 1950s equipped with “whites only” signs. Thirdly, territoriality entails the 
enforcement of control. This is expressed as attempts to impose limitations on access to the 
territory or as attempts to control people within or outside the territory. Delaney points out that 
this facet of territoriality indicates the superior status of territorial over non-territorial strategies 
                                                 
5 Actually, there are seven tendencies related to territoriality, but these three are part of the actual definition and are 
thus always present. For an elaboration of the remaining please see Sack (1986:32ff.).  
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as to effect access to things or resources (Delaney, 2005:77). As regards to the territorial state this 
is reflected in policies of sovereignty and domestic and foreign policies. 
 
2.1.1. The Territorial State 
The modern state is a good illustration of the historically contingence of territories. All too often 
the existence of the territorial state is taken for granted, as its special features are considered as 
the conditions for social life instead of products of social life. Although this is a very convenient 
analytical delimitation, it is also a quite simplistic and static way of approaching territories as 
analytical objects. The tendency to adopt this approach has perhaps been most noticeable within 
conventional international relations theory, where territorial states repeatedly and uncritically 
have been analysed as homogenous spatial units – even though state borders and the societies 
within have changed and evolved continuously throughout history (Delaney, 2005:35-87; Agnew, 
1994).  
 
The modern state system emerged around the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, when sovereignty 
and territory were formally linked together. Hence, the Treaty of Westphalia established a 
horizontal state system based on equal and mutual exclusive territorial states, which relied on 
states recognising states. Prior to this, in feudal medieval Europe, the system of power and 
authority was structured hierarchically, and the relation between lords and subjects were related 
to protection and service and were therefore not territorial based – or at least territorial in a 
much more complex sense (Taylor & Flint, 2000:156). The emerging new political order 
differentiated itself from the former “pre-modern” by not focusing on who had how much 
power, but rather who could be designated as a power, which involved a collective decision of 
mutual recognition. Based on that, reciprocal territorial sovereignty became the basis of the new 
international order (Ruggie, 1993:162). The principle of reciprocity has since developed into a 
general rule in international relations, and implies that any privilege, favour or penalty granted by 
one territorial state to another territorial state or its citizens should be rewarded in return. Peter 
Taylor adds that the element of sovereignty (and reciprocity) as the constitutive feature of the 
modern state provides “international capacity”. That is to say that it is only when states are 
recognised by other states as sovereign that they are able to act internationally – or rather 
interstatenessly (Taylor, 1995:6).  
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The division of Europe into administrative and territorial bounded spaces meant that territories 
could be regulated without interference from the surroundings. The logic behind this separating 
principle was to prevent conflict, which was furthermore backed up by various defensive 
measures such as armed forces and fortifications. However, this geopolitical system turned out to 
be rather unstable and brought numerous violent disputes and wars, as states strove for (and 
competed in) expanding their territories and thereby disputing the sovereignty of other states.  
 
Since then, the territorial state has gone from being merely a “power container” to also 
controlling economic, cultural and social aspects of human organisation (Taylor, 1994). The 
importance of the state as a “container” has thus expanded immensely since the Treaty of 
Westphalia, which has meant that the state today has gained a status of spatial supremacy – not 
least because of the fact that international relations theory, as noted above, consistently has 
emphasised the state as the most important geopolitical entity. Adding to this is the tendency 
among state leaders and diplomats to consider other states as the only legitimate actors. John G. 
Ruggie (who himself is positioned within international relations) is criticising this tendency to 
look at systems of rule as territorial or territorially fixed par se. And, as Ruggie adds, even if they 
are, they are not necessarily mutual exclusive (Ruggie, 1993:149). Agnew puts forward a similar 
critique by suggesting that international relations theory is the victim of the so-called “territorial 
trap”, which assumes that a) states are fixed sovereign spaces; b) domestic and foreign are 
polarised, and interaction does not occur on other spatial scales; and c) the territorial state has an 
a priori status to, and functions as, a container of society (Agnew, 1994).  
 
These assumptions have many shortcomings, but are nevertheless widespread. Therefore, there 
seems to be a growing need to recognise that the territorial state is not the only relevant system 
of rule, and that it is increasingly challenged by transnational interactions. As Ruggie points out, 
there is a tendency to neglect global markets’ and transnational corporate structures’ potential for 
international change, since they are not considered to have the ability to replace states (Ruggie, 
1993:143). I will return to this discussion later. For now, let us instead concentrate on the special 
territorial characteristics of Kaliningrad. 
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2.2. The Territory of Kaliningrad 
Kaliningrad Region is located on the southeast coast of the Baltic Sea, and with an area of 15,100 
square kilometres, it is the smallest region in the Russian Federation. Kaliningrad shares its 
northern and eastern borders with Lithuania (200 kilometres) and with Poland to the south (210 
kilometres). Furthermore, Kaliningrad has 140 kilometres of coastline towards the Baltic Sea. 
Altogether, this means that Kaliningrad is surrounded by foreign sovereign states and thus 
geographically detached from the rest of Russia. 
 
Figure 2.1: Map of Kaliningrad 
 
Source: BBC 
 
Historically, Kaliningrad was created at the Potsdam Peace Conference in 1945, when the former 
East Prussia, including the capital Konigsberg, was given to Russia. One year later, in 1946, 
Kaliningrad was made into a part of the Soviet Union, which led to the departure (and deporting) 
of the German population from Kaliningrad (Krickus, 2002:38). Hereafter, Kaliningrad was 
populated mainly by Russians and in the years that followed Kaliningrad developed into an 
important part in the Soviet Union. Due to its geographical location, Kaliningrad was turned into 
a military outpost, as its favourable climatic conditions provided the Soviet Union with the only 
ice-free port on the Baltic littoral, which made it the headquarters of the Baltic Sea Fleet and base 
for a large number of Soviet troops. In fact, an estimated one tenth of Kaliningrad’s population 
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of 950.000 was employed as servicemen in the Red Army.6 Subsequently, Kaliningrad had a 
prominent standing in the Soviet Union because of the very high status given to the military 
sector in the Soviet Union. However, all this changed with the end of the Cold War and the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. Hence, as the three Baltic States gained their independence in 
1991, Kaliningrad was suddenly isolated from the territory of mainland Russia, and was therefore 
no longer a Russian enclave in the Soviet Union – instead it was to be considered as a Russian 
exclave surrounded by sovereign states.  
 
Thus, today Kaliningrad is a part of Russia, and therefore Kaliningrad is Russian. The statement 
seems both obvious and trivial. But what exactly does it imply to be a part of Russia, and what 
does it mean to be Russian? To start with the former, being a part of Russia implies that 
Kaliningrad is included in a particular demarcated space, namely the territory of Russia. But, 
barring in mind that territories are passive without an a priori meaning, it is only through a 
continuous social effort of communication that the territory of Russia is established and 
maintained, and with Kaliningrad being a part of Russia, Kaliningrad is encompassed by this 
social effort with the purpose of maintaining it a part of the territory of Russia. Hence, the 
territory of Russia and subsequently the territory of Kaliningrad is consistently communicated to 
the people living within Russia (and thus Kaliningrad), as well as to the people living outside 
Russia by the use of a number of territorial strategies. This form of territoriality includes both 
physical and symbolic measures, which accordingly defines what is Russian. What is considered 
Russian is, first of all, communicated as bounded to the territory of Russia (classification by area), 
which is physically defined as a geographical area by external borders and maintained by border 
controls that restrict the access to the area (enforcement of control). Second, the area within 
these borders is assigned with specific symbolic characteristics in order to distinct it from the 
surrounding areas (communication of boundaries). Symbolic characteristics include regulatory 
arrangements such as common laws and rules of proper behaviour – along with the obvious 
nationalistic ones such as language, currency, flags etc. These elements constantly communicate 
the territory of Russia and are thus defining what it means to be a part of Russia, and what is to be 
considered as Russian.  
 
                                                 
6 Some estimate the total number of Soviet servicemen employed in Kaliningrad during the Cold War to be close to 
20 percent. 
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That is to say that Kaliningrad is similar to other parts of Russia with regards to the political and 
juridical system, administration, composition of population, cultural traditions and religious 
beliefs etc. This means that Kaliningrad is – in principle – encompassed by the same Russian 
territorial strategies as other parts of Russia.7 Furthermore, it should also be clear by now that 
Kaliningrad is not bound to be merely a part of Russia. Hence, suggestions about “a Russian 
Gateway to Europe” (Hoff & Timmermann, 1993) or “a Baltic Hong Kong” (Cottrell, 2001) tells 
us that Kaliningrad very well could be communicated as something else, or rather, as something 
more than a part of Russia. The Russian proposal from 1999 about turning Kaliningrad into a 
pilot region signifies this.  
 
2.2.1. Russia’s Proposal about a Pilot Region 
Russia’s proposal about making Kaliningrad a pilot region was initially put forward in 1999 in the 
“Medium Term Strategy for Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the 
European Union (2000-2010)” (Russian Federation, 1999). The Strategy’s primary focus was 
(and still is) to insure Russia’s national interests, including strengthening the role and image of 
Russia in Europe by mobilizing the economic potential and managerial experience of the 
European Union in order to foster a democratic Russia with rule of law and a market orientated 
economy (ibid. 1). The enlargement of the EU was given special attention, and it was consistently 
stressed in the Strategy that the enlargement of the EU should take into consideration the 
Russian concerns. One of these concerns was related to Kaliningrad. 
 
“Given a special geographical and economic situation of the Kaliningrad region, to create 
the necessary external conditions for its functioning and development as an integral part of the 
Russian Federation and an active participant in the transboundary and interregional cooperation. To 
determine the prospect of the optimal economic, energy and transportation specialization of 
the region to ensure its efficient functioning in the new environment. To establish the sound 
transportation links with the mainland. To pursue a line to the conclusion, if appropriate, of 
a special agreement with the EU on safeguarding the interests of the Kaliningrad region as 
an entity of the Russian Federation in the process of the EU expansion as well as to its 
transformation into a Russia’s pilot region within the framework of the Euro-Russian cooperation in the 
21st century” (ibid. 6, emphasis added). 
 
                                                 
7 I chapter 4, we will see that Kaliningrad – in practise – is encompassed by some extraordinary programs. 
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Thus, the Strategy recognised the territory of Kaliningrad’s particular situation, while 
emphasising that Kaliningrad is “an integral part of the Russian Federation”, thereby 
underscoring that Russia’s territorial sovereignty is applying in Kaliningrad – even though 
Kaliningrad is geographically located “outside” mainland Russia. However, the Strategy also 
proposed that Kaliningrad was given a special role in transboundary and interregional 
cooperation between Russia and the EU, and suggested that Kaliningrad was turned into a pilot 
region. In that respect, it is noticeable that the Strategy refered to Russia’s pilot region, thus again 
referring to Russian sovereignty and indicating that a pilot region would first and foremost be 
laboratory for Russian cooperative policies vis-à-vis the EU.  
 
As pointed out earlier, the idea of making Kaliningrad was quietly forgotten, and meanwhile the 
enlargement of the EU became a reality in May 2004. This meant that Kaliningrad’s geopolitical 
surroundings changed, and Kaliningrad geographical location and territorial status in the 
relationship between the EU and Russia from now on implied that Kaliningrad was both enclave 
and exclave.  
 
2.3. Exclaves and enclaves 
From a traditional state-centric perspective, the territory of Kaliningrad is best described as a 
peculiarity. Not that the territory of Kaliningrad is unaffected by territorialities associated with 
the territorial state. In fact, as we will see below, the territory of Kaliningrad underscores their 
relevance as Kaliningrad’s geographical location elucidates territoriality in a number of ways. 
Actually, by paraphrasing Huntington’s notion on civilisations (Huntington, 1993), the territory 
of Kaliningrad can be characterised as a “clash of territorialities” as it has a status as both exclave 
and enclave. These concepts require some explanation. 
 
What makes exclaves particularly interesting is the fact that they illustrate relations between states 
in difficult geographical circumstances and that they show the importance of territories. If we 
look at the strict definition of an exclave, an exclave is “…a part of the territory of one country 
entirely surrounded by the territory of another country” (Robinson, 1959:283). This definition 
corresponds with the one used in international law, where exclaves are defined as land-locked 
territories separated from the mainland (Vinokurov, forthcoming/b:9). Evgeny Vinokurov 
defines three criteria that determine the distinction between an exclave and the mainland: 1) the 
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capital is located in the mainland, 2) the relative size of the territory, and 3) the relative size of the 
population. Out of these three criteria, the location of the capital is the primary, since the capital 
represents the concentration of the political power – i.e. the legal and sovereign right to exercise 
power over the territory (ibid. 11). Following these definitions, Kaliningrad is not to be 
considered as an exclave. First of all, Kaliningrad is not surrounded by a country, but by two 
countries, Lithuania and Poland respectively. Second, Kaliningrad has sea access to the Baltic Sea 
and is therefore not land-locked. Nevertheless, the territory of Kaliningrad shares one important 
similarity with what we can call a normal exclave – it is separated from the mainland and therefore 
surrounded by something else. In order to classify Kaliningrad as an exclave, it seems necessary 
to come up with a description, which complies with Kaliningrad’s specific characteristic.  
 
G. W. S. Robinson has systematically scrutinised the diverse characteristics of exclaves as special 
geographical phenomena (Robinson, 1959). According to Robinson, what make exclaves unusual 
are the specific conditions of social life within the exclaves. These conditions arise from three 
special circumstances: 1) a special relation with the home country/mainland, 2) a special relation 
with the neighbouring country, and/or 3) a special regime within the exclave itself. Apart from the 
relation to the mainland, exclaves thus share some similarities with tiny states encircled by other 
countries (ibid. 292). The primary, but very important, divergence between exclaves and tiny 
states, is the authorities in tiny states are capable to act on their own behalf in international 
relations, while foreign relations of exclaves are maintained by the relevant state authorities i.e. 
the mainland.  
 
However, exclaves are associated with some ambiguity, and therefore Robinson lists four sub-
definitions, which for various reasons divert from the aforementioned and quite uncommon 
normal exclave. First, there are the so-called pene-exclaves, which are technically not separated 
from the mainland, but in practise only accessible through the territory of another state. Hence, 
direct access is hindered by difficulty in the terrain (e.g. mountains), or by narrowness of the 
territorial isthmus. Most pene-exclaves could therefore be accessible from the mainland by the 
construction of special roads or corridors (ibid. 283). Second, there are quasi-exclaves. Quasi-
exclaves are exclaves, which do not function as exclaves. This definition covers a territory 
surrounded by another territory, but connected to the mainland by a corridor. Another example 
of a quasi-exclave is a territory separated from the mainland, but occupied by another country, 
which means that it is de facto a part of the occupying territory (ibid. 284f.). Third, we have virtual 
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exclaves, which are territories treated as exclaves of a country all though they are not an integral 
part of the country in a strict legal sense. The Vatican City State is an example of a virtual 
exclave, as lands and buildings in and around Rome are extra-territorial from Italy and are 
effectively under Vatican administration (ibid. 285). Fourth and finally, there are temporary exclaves, 
which are created when state territory is divided by an avowedly temporary or provisional line, 
such as an occupation-zone. The most common example of a temporary exclave (which no 
longer exists, and thus has proven to be temporary) was West Berlin. West Berlin was a 
particularly interesting exclave, since it not only involved two countries (i.e. mainland and 
neighbouring state) as it is normally the case for exclaves. Instead, West Berlin involved two 
major geopolitical regimes – namely the “East” and the “West” and was therefore involving a 
number of territories and the associated territorialities – not least the United States of America 
and the Soviet Union (ibid. 287).  
 
As should be clear by now, the definition of an exclave is strongly associated with the relation to 
the mainland. Hence, the above definitions in some way or another refer to exclaves’ degree of 
detachment vis-à-vis the mainland. It seems, however, equally important to reflect on the degree of 
attachment to the neighbouring state. That is to say that while exclaves relate to the mainland, 
they also relate to the neighbouring state as enclaves. The decisive factor in that respect is the 
exclave’s geographic location “inside” another territory, which is not the mainland. This implies 
that the neighbouring country has some degree of territorial influence on the enclave, as the 
inhabitants of the enclave often rely on transit of people and goods through the neighbouring 
territory in order to connect to the mainland. As such, the neighbouring country represents 
separation between the enclave and the mainland, and, in that respect, the neighbouring country’s 
enforcement of sovereignty is the crucial element. Hence, separation between the enclave and 
the mainland does not necessarily constitute a problem, if the neighbouring country is willing to 
give up some degree of sovereignty – and thus abstains from making use of its right to deny 
unrestricted passage through its territory. However, the neighbouring country might also set up 
restrictions on transit in order to receive compensation for the “violation” of sovereignty. The 
two most common examples of restrictions imposed by the neighbouring country are transit 
tariffs and visa regulations. 
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2.4. Kaliningrad – exclave and enclave 
Kaliningrad is not a clear-cut example of an enclave, because it is not encircled by one country, 
and thus not enclave to a neighbouring state. Rather, Kaliningrad is an enclave to a political 
regime, namely the European Union. Hence, there are some common rules (i.e. territorialities) 
within and between the borders of the EU member states, which, from a geopolitical 
perspective, homogenize the member states vis-à-vis non-member states (the acquis communautaire8 
is perhaps the best example of this). As such, the EU member states have succeeded in 
implementing common territoriality, which calls for a common effort to uphold. This means that 
although the EU is not a territorial state, it can in many respects be considered as one territory. I 
will return to the discussion about the EU’s territoriality in the next chapter. 
 
Kaliningrad’s geographical situation is thus two folded: even though it is not an enclave in either 
Lithuania or Poland, it is an enclave within the territory of the EU, and movement of people and 
goods in and out of Kaliningrad to a large degree lies within the competence of the EU. Hence, 
the decisive component in Kaliningrad’s enclavity concerns the movement of people and goods, 
transit, external trade etc. These matters are dealt with by the EU, who therefore controls the 
content of Kaliningrad’s enclavity. On the other hand, from the Russian point of view, 
Kaliningrad is an exclave, which means that the territory of Kaliningrad is Russian territory, and 
that Russian territoriality (not least Russian sovereignty) is applicable within the borders of 
Kaliningrad. Therefore, the implications entailed by the concentration of political power in 
mainland Russia means that Kaliningrad’s exclavity is within the competence of Russian federal 
authorities – especially as regards to external relations.9 The significance of territoriality is thus 
indeed highlighted by Kaliningrad’s location within EU territory and outside mainland Russia, 
which leads to the aforementioned rhetorical suggestion that Kaliningrad is a “clash of 
territorialities” between Russia and the EU. Kaliningrad is therefore a good example of Ruggie’s 
remark on territories as not necessarily being mutually exclusive (Ruggie, 1993:149), since both 
the EU and mainland Russia have a direct impact on the territory of Kaliningrad.10  
                                                 
8 The so-called acquis communautaire refers to the total body of EU legislation accumulated so far. 
9 According to article 71 in the Constitution of the Russian Federation of 1993, it is the central federal authorities 
that have the responsibility for Russia’s foreign policy, international relations, international treaties, questions of war 
and peace as well as the foreign trade relations of the Russian Federation. Even though article 72 stipulates 
coordination between the federal and regional level in matters of external economic relations and compliance with 
treaties, it is unclear how this coordination is put into practise (Russian Federation, 1993). 
10 A more pessimistic description of Kaliningrad’s situation relates to discussions on centre and periphery, which 
from a traditional statist approach favours the centre and calls for strict enforcement of borders does not tolerate 
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 This means that Kaliningrad is not just any Russian region. Rather, Kaliningrad is particular in 
the sense that its territory is affected by territorial strategies stemming from both the EU and 
mainland Russia. Vinokurov describes this dependence of “external powers” as two-dimensional 
(Vinokurov, 2004/a:6). For that reason, the development in Kaliningrad is relying on the degree 
of conformity of the territorial strategies imposed by the EU and Russia. By being exposed to 
conflicting policies, Kaliningrad risks being squeezed between the two sides, which, other things 
being equal, will affect Kaliningrad negatively. In other words, positive development in 
Kaliningrad is relying on its enclavity and exclavity are regulated in accordance with each other. 
Thus, any attempts made by the EU and/or Russia in terms of aligning their territorial strategies 
in general and towards Kaliningrad in particular will have beneficial consequences in Kaliningrad. 
As such, Kaliningrad is depending on the EU and Russia to adopt territorial rapprochement 
strategies. That way, Kaliningrad will not just be a question mark on whether territories are 
mutually exclusive, but rather Kaliningrad would be a territory of inclusion. A prerequisite for 
this is obviously that the EU and Russia have a common interest in territorial rapprochement. In 
this context the four Common Spaces provide a relevant policy framework. 
                                                                                                                                                        
overlaps. According to this approach, Kaliningrad could risk to turn into a so-called “double periphery”, where the 
borders obstruct attempts to cooperate (Joenniemi & Prawitz, 1998; Joenniemi et al., 2000:9). 
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3. Territoriality and the Four Common Spaces 
 
 
The four Common Spaces are the result of a longstanding dialogue between the EU and Russia, 
whose main objective since the fall of the Iron Curtain has been to create what Gorbachev once 
called “a common European Home” (Gorbachev, 1989) or to use the more recent dogma “a 
Europe without dividing lines” (Prodi, 2004). Such phrasings are more or less explicitly 
recognising a Europe containing (at least two) separated territorial bounded systems of rule, and 
it seems fair to assume that the EU and Russia regard themselves as the two most important 
actors. The primary challenge for the EU and Russia in order to create a Europe is therefore to 
erase the territorial differences by pursuing territorial strategies of inclusion rather then territorial 
strategies of exclusion. In order to do so, the parties have entered into a strategic partnership based 
on equality – even though it at times seems that the EU is considering itself to be superior, while 
Russia is experiencing to be treated as inferior in the relationship. It is the conditions set out by 
the strategic partnership that determine if and how Kaliningrad can assume the role as a pilot 
region for cooperation. This chapter will analyse the four Common Spaces by looking at the 
premises for this cooperative framework. Especially, the objective about avoiding dividing lines 
is of interest, as this intention could point towards the creation of one territory. 
 
It was argued previously that the EU can be characterised as one territory (i.e. a common territory 
for the member states). As such, the EU is to a great extend a good example on how territorial 
inclusion can be conducted. The EU consists of sovereign territorial states with different – and 
often conflicting – histories. Notwithstanding this antagonistic past, these territorial states have 
managed to establish a community based on common territoriality, which has created the 
territory of the EU. Obviously, the four Common Spaces are not intended to copy the EU’s 
model for territorial integration, but it is nevertheless interesting to compare the two, as this 
reveals the differences and the shortcomings of the approach adopted by the EU and Russia.  
 
3.1. Territoriality of the Four Common Spaces 
The decision to work towards a common economic space; a common space of freedom, security 
and justice; a common space of external security, as well as a common space of research and 
education, including cultural aspects was made at the EU-Russia Summit in Sankt Petersburg in 
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May 2003. The agenda set out by the four Common Spaces was later – at the Summit in May 
2005 – made operational by the adoption of the “Road Maps for the implementation for the 
creation of the four Common Spaces” (EU & Russia, 2005). The Road Maps were adopted as a 
single package and is the first time that the EU and Russia jointly have set shared specific targets 
for the development of their territorial relations. In chapter 4, I will go further into details about 
the Road Maps and compare their objectives to activities in Kaliningrad. For now, I will 
concentrate on the characteristics of the four Common Spaces and the Road Maps. 
 
The four Common Spaces encapsulate EU’s external relations policy as well as Russian foreign 
policy and represents a mutual commitment to regulate “internal” or “domestic” matters. For 
example within the context of the Common Economic Space (CES), the EU and Russia are 
mutually committed to develop harmonised and compatible standards in a number of industrial 
sectors (EU & Russia, 2005:1-9). However, as neither of the two have direct competences as 
regards their strategic partner’s internal/domestic issues, the only way to realise harmonisation and 
compatible standards is by both parties respectively to manage the regulation internally. The 
purpose of the CES is therefore to enhance external/foreign trade and economic relations by the 
means of internal/domestic reforms. This can be initiated by reasons of individual incitement or 
encouragement/pressure from the partner. Of course, not all the objectives in the four Common 
Spaces necessitate reforms or regulations, but the point is that the goals set out by the four 
Common Spaces require action by the EU and Russia if they expect to gain from the cooperative 
framework. It is only by coordinated alignment of internal/domestic territoriality that the Spaces 
will become common. However, this does not necessarily lead to the creation of one common 
territory. 
 
The four Common Spaces can be described as an agenda for a common territorial strategy, 
whose purpose is to foster cooperation by diminishing the degree of territorial exclusion between 
the EU and Russia. This is in line with Ruggie and Agnew, who emphasise that it is misleading to 
operate with territories – especially territorial states – as mutually exclusive, as social interactions 
occur on a number of spatial scales and are not confined by state boundaries. James Anderson 
argues similarly that notions on absolute space (i.e. mutually exclusive territories) are 
problematic, and that territoriality and sovereignty are much more complex and relative than that 
(Anderson, 1996:140). Therefore, it is pertinent to think of sovereignty in plural in stead of 
singular. That is to say that territoriality (i.e. sovereignty) overlaps and that interaction occurs on 
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many spatial scales, which, however, does not imply the end of territoriality (nor sovereignty). In 
the words of Anderson:  
 
“territory is loosing some of its importance as a basis of sovereignty and political rule, but 
states and territorialities are being qualitatively transformed, rather than states ‘declining’ or 
‘territorially based sovereignty’ ending” (ibid. 150). 
 
The four Common Spaces are steps in this direction. Not that the EU (member states) or Russia 
are giving up territorial sovereignty by the agreement. The parties are merely recognising that 
many of the challenges they are facing are non-territorial and better dealt with by joining efforts, 
and that this means a certain degree of territorial mitigation – i.e. adopting common territorial 
strategies based on rapprochement. That is to say that the realization of the Common Spaces in 
some way or another depends on the EU and Russia’s willingness to develop common territorial 
strategies, which is an acknowledgment of the fact that some challenges are more effectively 
confronted by creating overlapping spaces. Hence, the thought of overlapping spaces indeed 
relates to the dialogue between EU and Russian leaders and diplomats. For a number of years, 
the focal point in this dialogue has concentrated on how to avoid “dividing lines” in Europe – a 
theme, which has been reinforced by the introduction of the four Common Spaces (EU & 
Russia, 2005:21).  
 
However, whereas the four Common Spaces are designed to enhance common territorial 
strategies, they are not intended to create a common territory, since this can only be done if the 
EU and Russia recognise that sharing something means giving something up. Hence, to avoid 
“dividing lines” means to challenge the thought of mutual exclusiveness, which, as stated earlier, 
is the main assumption behind sovereignty and thus the territorial state. The four Common 
Spaces are not implying plural sovereignty, as the framework is not proposing the parties to give 
up or share territorial authority. The EU and Russia will remain two separated territories, even 
though their territorialities are aligned towards each other. This means that while territoriality can 
create spatial demarcations based on exclusion and sovereignty, the reversed scenario is equally 
possible by focusing on territories of inclusion and cooperation. The four Common Spaces are a 
step in that direction. 
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From the perspective of this study, it is noticeable that Kaliningrad is not mentioned in the four 
Common Spaces. Of cause the four Common Spaces cannot take into account the situation of 
every Russian region, but Kaliningrad is not just any Russian region – especially not in the 
context of the EU-Russian relationship. Since the four Common Spaces does not deal with 
Kaliningrad’s geopolitical inside-outside predicament, Kaliningrad’s status is implicitly recognised 
as “inside” Russia and “outside” the EU. Thus, the four Common Spaces ignores the fact that 
Kaliningrad in some ways is “inside” the EU and “outside” Russia, which signifies that 
Kaliningrad is treated as an external matter by the EU and a Russian internal matter. However, 
the special situation of Kaliningrad is acknowledged in the context of the Northern Dimension 
Initiative, which might provide a particular important instrument for Kaliningrad in the future. 
 
3.1.1. The Northern Dimension Initiative 
The Northern Dimension Initiative (NDI) is the EU’s response to the developments in its 
eastern neighbourhood in the 1990s. In order to deal with (primarily) the independence of the 
three Baltic States, the EU in 1997 started to discuss the concept of a Northern Dimension, thereby 
giving the area special attention. In December 1998, the European Council adopted a 
Commission Communication on a “Northern Dimension for the policies of the Union” 
(Commission of the European Communities, 1998). This was further specified by the Council in 
June 2000 with the first “Action Plan for the Northern Dimension with external and cross-
border policies of the European Union, 2001-2003” (NDAP) (Council of the European Union, 
2000). The Second NDAP covers the period from 2004 till 2006, and the objective is to pay 
special attention to areas with particular needs, and the NDAP specifically mentions Kaliningrad 
as such an area (Council of the European Union, 2003:3).  
 
At the fourth Northern Dimension Ministerial Meeting, held in Brussels on 21 November 2005, 
it was agreed to work towards a more stable policy replacing the current three-year programs, 
and the parties agreed on the “Guidelines for the development of a political declaration and a 
policy framework document on the Northern Dimension” (Northern Dimension, 2005). This 
new set of guidelines was drafted and adopted jointly by the EU, Iceland, Norway and Russia and 
states that:  
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“While keeping the broad geographical coverage, the Northern Dimension policy should be 
used as a political and operational framework for promoting the implementation of the EU-
Russia Common Spaces at regional/sub-regional/local level in the North with full 
participation of Norway and Iceland” (Northern Dimension, 2005:2).  
 
As such, the new Northern Dimension policy will become a regional expression of the four 
Common Spaces, and will accordingly be designed with reference to the objectives defined by 
the Common Spaces. The final policy framework of the new Northern Dimension will be 
negotiated and adopted by the EU, Russia, Norway and Iceland jointly, which provides an 
indication of the parties’ commitment to develop their relations based on equality. It is explicitly 
stated in the guideline document that the success on the new Northern Dimension depends on 
active involvement from the Russian authorities (Northern Dimension, 2005:5). As regards to 
Kaliningrad and the other priority areas (the Arctic and Sub-arctic areas), the guideline document 
describes the primary tasks as:  
 
“Assuring the full economic and social integration of these priority areas within the 
dynamics of the Northern Dimension region while preserving at the same time national 
sovereignty is a [Northern Dimension] objective” (Northern Dimension, 2005:2).  
 
The Northern Dimension Initiative is therefore of great significance to Kaliningrad, and could 
potentially help to boost the idea of making Kaliningrad a pilot region for the four Common 
Spaces and make it a territory of inclusion. 
 
3.2. Territoriality of the EU 
As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, the EU is a good example of territorial inclusion. 
The territoriality of the EU is in a number of ways different from the territoriality of the modern 
state, as the EU’s territoriality is less strict and less exclusive than territorial states. That is to say 
that the member states can “opt out” from parts of the EU’s territorial strategies (e.g. Denmark 
is not part of the European Monetary Union) while other territorial strategies can be applied to 
“external” territories (e.g. Norway is part of the Schengen Area and the European Economic 
Area). Likewise, the borders, which are normally a central part of the enforcement of a territory, 
are also assuming a different character in the EU compared to the territorial state, as the EU’s 
external borders do not qualify for a category of their own. Hence, whereas the EU’s external 
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border to Norway is an “open border” with little – if any – visible enforcement, the external 
border to Kaliningrad is a “closed border” with very strict border controls (Kaliningrad’s border 
management will be discussed in chapter 4.2.1.). Furthermore, in theory, every member state is 
free to give up its membership and thus leave the EU any time without the risk of sanctions. 
According to Virginie Mamadouh, this indicates that the EU is a new form of political territorial 
governance (Mamadouh, 2001). This territorial governance has in many ways gained supremacy 
towards the member states and assumes a supranational character, as the member states have 
handed a degree of sovereignty over to the legislative EU institutions: 
 
“[…] the supranational character of the EU is such that decisions taken by its supranational 
institutions are binding to the Member States. This supranational character is sometimes 
blurred by the fact that the executives of the Member States are collectively one of the key 
institutions involved in this decision-making process (the Council) which shares the 
legislative powers with the Commission and the Parliament” (Mamadouh, 2001:424) 
 
This cession of territorial competences and authority is interesting and a paradoxical way of 
dealing with the shortcomings of the traditional territorial state. Hence, the mechanisms, which 
have fostered the territorial state, is also to a certain degree restricting territorial states in terms of 
responding to issues that are non-territorial (e.g. environmental issues, organised crime, world 
trade etc.). It is this paradox that has been coined “the unbundling of territoriality”, which in the 
case of the EU has gone further than anywhere else (Ruggie, 1993:171). Manuel Castells argues 
furthermore that: 
 
“The formation of the EU […] was the construction of a political cartel, the Brussels cartel, 
in which European national states can still carve out, collectively, some level of sovereignty 
from the new global disorder, and then distribute the benefits among its members, under 
endlessly negotiated rules” (Castells, 2004:329). 
 
This means that by surrendering territorial authority, the EU member states are able to respond 
to the new (non-)territorial challenges and – paradoxically – uphold some degree of sovereignty.  
 
The legal acts (i.e. regulations and directives) in the EU are furthermore central aspects of the 
practise of territoriality within the territory of the EU. Hence, EU regulations are binding and 
directly applicable in all the member states, while the directives are binding on the member 
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states, which means that the member states themselves are responsible for the implementation in 
national legislation (Mamadouh, 2001:424). As such, EU’s territoriality is mediated through the 
member states. This territorial arrangement has – in spite of being criticised as bureaucratic and 
protracted – made the EU a common territory for its member states. In fact, to a certain degree, 
the EU is also recognised as one legitimate actor in international organisations (e.g. in the context 
of the WTO). 
 
3.3. Towards a Common EU-Russian Territory? 
The four Common Spaces are indicating that the EU and Russia are aiming at territorial 
rapprochement. However, the four Common Spaces are not intended to create one territory, as 
we know from the EU integration process. Even though, the EU and Russia (supposedly) 
recognise that both territories face common challenges that are non-territorial, they do not 
intend to hand over territorial authority to the other party or to create common institutions 
(similar to the European Council). That is to say that the four Common Spaces are not 
proposing the EU (member states) or Russia to give up sovereignty and are therefore not 
pursuing any form of supranational framework between the EU and Russia. 
 
The common ambition to remove territorial borders is reflected in the slogan about “building a 
new Europe without dividing lines” (EU & Russia, 2005:21), which recognises the historical 
contingence of territories by representing Europe’s past as divided while picturing the future as 
united. Anssi Paasi notes that the most common thought about Europe has distinguished 
between the “East” and the “West” (or rather, Russia and the EU) and that this geopolitical 
“imagination” is still prevalent among politicians, economists and academics (Paasi, 2000:8). 
Nevertheless, the four Common Spaces aims at removing territorial boundaries between the EU 
and Russia. This goes for boundaries concerning economy, freedom of movement, foreign 
politics/external relations, culture and education. By doing so, it could be argued that the EU 
and Russia are aiming at creating some form of common territoriality by coordinating the 
exercise of territorial control within and between their territories. For example the Road Maps 
envisage a visa-free regime as a long-term perspective, which calls for some kind of common 
territoriality, since visa-free travel will necessitate a common classification by area, 
communication of boundaries as well as enforcement of control (cf. Sack’s definition of 
territoriality). As such, visa-free travel between the EU and Russia could establish a territory 
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stipulating freedom of movement between the two territories – perhaps even along the lines of 
the EU’s Schengen Treaty.  
 
Another parallel between the four Common Spaces and the EU integration process is the 
significant focus on economy and trade as means of territorial integration. Hence, judging from 
the scope of the CES, this “space” is given particular attention. This is in line with the formation 
of the EU, as “[…] integration has been above all economic integration” (Paasi, 2000:11). 
Therefore, like the formation of the EU, the four Common Spaces represent a common 
territorial strategy to overcome separation and is accordingly to be characterised as a strategy of 
inclusion. However, the four Common Spaces are not forcing the EU and Russia to pursue 
territorial integration (nor specifying who should integrate towards whom), but merely signifying 
the common intention to do so. Thus, regardless of the resemblance between the four Common 
Spaces and the EU’s acquis communautaire (Emerson, 2005:2), the four Common Spaces are not 
intended to create one common territory but rather to work towards two aligned, though 
separated, territories with a high degree of territorial overlaps. 
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4. Kaliningrad and the Four Common Spaces 
 
 
Notwithstanding Kaliningrad’s special geopolitical status in the relationship between the EU and 
Russia, the four Common Spaces does not refer to Kaliningrad anywhere. As such, the four 
Common Spaces are only concerned with the overall agenda for the EU and Russia’s territorial 
relations. However, as this chapter will show, many of the objectives in the four Common Spaces 
are both relevant for Kaliningrad, as well as several existing initiatives in Kaliningrad have similar 
intentions as the four Common Spaces. 
 
This chapter is subdivided into four sections (cf. the four sections in the Road Maps). Each of 
the four sections will introduce one of the four Common Spaces and compare its objectives to 
the situation in Kaliningrad and the existing initiatives in the region. The analysis will focus in 
particular on initiatives, which are outcomes of cooperation between the EU and Russia, or 
initiatives designed to foster cooperation between the EU and Russia in the context of 
Kaliningrad. Likewise, the analysis will draw attention to correspondence between the various 
initiatives’ objectives and Kaliningrad’s special status in the relationship between the EU and 
Russia. The results provided by this analysis will be summarised underway and will be further 
discussed in chapter 5. 
 
4.1. Kaliningrad and the Common Economic Space 
The overall objective of the Common Economic Space (CES) is described as the creation of an 
open and integrated market between the EU and Russia. It is fair to say that this is an extremely 
ambitious agenda and is accordingly the “space”, which is given the most attention by EU and 
Russian diplomats. The wish to strengthen the economic ties has traditionally been a major 
priority in the EU-Russia relationship. For example the EU and Russia’s Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement (PCA) from 1997 explicitly mentioned the creation of a free trade area 
between the EU and Russia as one of the main priorities in the relationship (EU & Russia, 
1997:11). The idea of free trade was also brought up in the EU’s Common Strategy of the 
European Union on Russia in 1999 (European Council, 1999) and Russia’s Medium Term 
Strategy towards the EU (Russian Federation, 1999), which both call for progressive 
approximation of legislation and standards between the EU and Russia in order to foster 
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increased economic cooperation. As such, the CES is not a completely new invention, but rather 
the continuation of the dialogue and common focus on economic ties as a fundamental element 
in avoiding geopolitical dividing lines in Europe as well as the recognition of enhanced trade as a 
means to achieve economic growth of mutual benefit. Under the heading Building Blocks for 
Sustained Economic Growth the aim of the CES is accordingly:  
 
“[…] to put in place conditions which will increase opportunities for economic operators, 
promote trade and investment, facilitate the establishment and operation of companies on a 
reciprocal basis, strengthen cooperation in the field of energy, transport, agriculture and 
environment, reinforce economic cooperation and reforms and enhance the competitiveness 
of the EU and Russian economies, based on the principle of non-discrimination, 
transparency and good governance […]” (EU & Russia, 2005:1).  
 
The key element in the CES is accordingly to promote conditions, which can lead to increased 
trade and thereby strengthened economic ties between the EU and Russia. Broadly speaking, the 
purpose is to ensure a comparable environment for the functioning of economic operators on 
the markets on both sides and to promote two-way investments. This means that it should be 
easier for EU enterprises to engage in activities on the territory of Russia and vice versa.  
 
The Road Map for the CES is subdivided into six overall topics, which deal with general issues 
of trade and economic cooperation; trade facilitation and customs; networks: 
telecommunications and transport; energy; space and environment. Not all of these are 
applicable to Kaliningrad – at least not in a direct sense. For example the topic about general 
issues of trade and economic cooperation calls for a regulatory dialogue on industrial products 
(EU & Russia, 2005:1), which aims to promote the gradual approximation of the relevant 
legislation, needs to be conducted at a federal level as Kaliningrad as a Russian federal subject do 
not have any competences in that respect. Likewise, cooperation in the fields of Energy and 
Space is also unlikely to benefit from lessons learned in Kaliningrad. However, Kaliningrad holds 
the potential to test some of the CES objectives’ subordinated intentions as programs with 
similar characteristics are already in place in the region. That is to say that given the isolation 
from mainland Russia and the deriving disadvantages, conditions intended to increase the 
economic activity in Kaliningrad have been promoted for a number of years in the region. 
 
 - 30 -
4.1.1. Investor-Friendly Region 
The idea of attracting economic operators is not new for Kaliningrad. Since Kaliningrad is 
separated from the mainland, the authorities (both local, regional and federal) have been very 
focused on attracting “outside” investors since the early 1990s. The term “outside” investors is 
used deliberately to encompass both foreign investors and domestic mainland investors and are 
thus suggesting that the regional economic development in Kaliningrad is relying on two 
outside/external markets. Furthermore, as pointed out earlier, Kaliningrad’s status as exclave and 
enclave in many ways resemble the situation of tiny states, which are normally relatively 
dependent on an open economy and external trade. Kaliningrad, however, has the notable 
dissimilarity with tiny states that the regional authorities are unable to act on their own in 
international relations – including trade. For Kaliningrad, this means that undertakings aiming at 
attracting outside investors principally are dealt with at the federal level. 
 
The establishment of Kaliningrad as a so-called Free Economic Zone (FEZ) in 1991 is one of 
such initiatives and granted a number of benefits to domestic and foreign entrepreneurs – most 
notably with respect to customs and taxation of profit. However, due to a lack of positive results 
provided by the FEZ, the regime was phased out in 1996. In stead, it was decided to turn 
Kaliningrad into a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) – partly by reason for compensation for the 
abolishing of FEZ, and partly to reimburse the region for its status as an exclave and the 
associated disadvantages. That is to say that Kaliningrad went through an economic regression 
following the termination of the FEZ, and the authorities thus acknowledged that Kaliningrad 
could not do without special privileges (Zhdanov et al., 2002:12f). The Special Economic Zone 
in Kaliningrad is – like the preceding FEZ – designed to create favourable conditions for 
companies and entrepreneurs who import foreign raw materials and components with the 
purpose of producing to the Russian market (Russian Federation, 1996). The SEZ does not 
distinguish between foreign and domestic entrepreneurs as it is solely focusing on creating 
economic activity in Kaliningrad. The main elements in the SEZ are: 
 
• exemption of customs duties and other duties for goods produced in the region and 
exported to other countries,11 
                                                 
11 Goods are considered to be produced in the region if the added value of their processing is minimum 30 percent 
(for some electronics and sophisticated consumer appliances the added value for processing is set to only 15 
percent). 
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• exemption of import duties and other duties for goods imported from other countries, 
and 
• exemption of import duties and other duties for goods produced in the region and 
“exported” to other parts of Russia (ibid.). 
 
These benefits suggest that Kaliningrad’s economy can be characterised as import-oriented as a 
result of the SEZ – though the purpose is that the benefits will increase its export by offering 
these benefits. However, Kaliningrad’s intermediate position in the EU-Russian trade means that 
Kaliningrad is a less developed trading partner vis-à-vis the EU, and a more developed partner vis-
à-vis mainland Russia (Vinokurov, 2004/a:6). Therefore, the most logical market to direct the 
export is the mainland, as Kaliningrad companies have a competitive advantage. Thus, altogether 
the SEZ has established a regime resembling a customs-free zone, which has first and foremost 
benefited the “export” to the Russian mainland (Stepanov, 2003:18 & Zhdanov, 2002:15).  
 
The law on SEZ was renewed in April 2006 by President Putin, and thereby extended for 25 
years. The new law on SEZ is first and foremost designed to make Kaliningrad’s economy more 
export-oriented, which, as illustrated by table 4.1, is rather pertinent. 
 
Table 4.1: Kaliningrad’s foreign trade in million Euros12
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Export of goods13 371 355 368 448 918 1,427 
Import of goods  684 818 1,258 1,673 2,448 3,185 
Balance of trade -313 -463 -890 -1,225 -1,530 -1,758 
Source: Pan-European Institute. 
 
The governor in Kaliningrad, Georgij Boos, has been very involved in promoting the new law on 
the SEZ, as he recognises that attracting foreign investments and know-how are a necessity for 
the region. From the point of view of investors the extension of the SEZ provides predictability 
and thereby gives an increased incitement to invest in Kaliningrad, which could boost the 
economic activity further. The new law on SEZ – in addition to the predecessor – stipulates that 
new companies investing at least € 4.5 million in the region over three years are given privileges 
                                                 
12 “Export” to the Russian mainland is not included in the table. 
13 The significant increase in the export activity in 2004 and primarily in 2005 is coursed by the high oil prices. 
Hence, Russian oil companies are channelling their export through Kaliningrad, which subsequently figures in the 
statistics for Kaliningrad (Liuhto, 2005b:10).  
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on taxation and property (Russian Federation, 2005). As such, whereas the previous law on the 
SEZ gave preferential treatment to small and medium-sized companies, the focus is now on 
larger companies.  
 
There are, however, several obstacles to economic operators in Kaliningrad – although they are 
becoming less significant. A study carried out by the World Bank’s Foreign Investment Advisory 
Service about the administrative barriers for investments in Kaliningrad shows that although 
there are difficulties involved in conducting business in Kaliningrad, there are increasingly fewer 
who consider the administrative barriers to be severe (World Bank, 2004:4). The most 
troublesome areas are considered to be export and import documentation, where 32 percent of 
foreign economic operators consider it to be a “major” or a “very severe” problem.14 In order to 
help eliminate these barriers, there are a number of smaller development agencies located in 
Kaliningrad – with the most important being the Regional Development Agency (RDA).  
 
Kaliningrad’s Regional Development Agency is a non-profit organisation, which is partly funded 
by the EU, and as stated on the website the aim is to “be the main provider of economic 
research, regional development forecasting and enterprise support in the Region”. As such, the 
purpose is to attract and assist new companies to Kaliningrad in order to create a favourable and 
stable business environment as well as to develop new mechanisms for cooperation between 
Russia and the EU. Among other initiatives, the RDA has published a comprehensive business 
guide to foreigners who wish to engage in Kaliningrad (RDA, 2006). However, so far the RDA’s 
activities has mostly been concentrated within research for governing bodies, and – besides the 
business guide – business-related activities have been limited (Danish Neighbourhood 
Programme, 2005:14). That is to say that the objective to foster cooperation between the EU and 
Russia has not been prioritised noticeably yet.  
 
Altogether, even though there are matters in Kaliningrad, which can worry foreign investors (e.g. 
administrative barriers, high degree of corruption and criminal activity), Kaliningrad’s business 
climate is characterised by providing opportunities for economic operators from both the EU and 
Russia/Kaliningrad to strengthen the economic ties.   
 
                                                 
14 Certification and taxation are perceived as “major” or “very severe” problems by 19 percent and 18 percent, 
respectively (World Bank, 2004:4). 
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4.1.2. Economic Development in Kaliningrad 
The SEZ had a long start-up period and the effects were not instantaneous. It is, however, 
thought to have increased the economic activity in Kaliningrad even though it has been accused 
of an opaque administration. Hence, not all analysts are convinced that the SEZ has had a 
positive effect (Zhdanov et al., 2002) or that the new SEZ will foster a positive economic 
development (Vinokurov, forthcoming/a:177). On the other hand, it is difficult to assess the 
effects of the SEZ, since we cannot know, if the economic development in Kaliningrad had been 
different (worse or better) without the SEZ.  
 
Having said that, there is no doubt that with an annual growth in the Gross Regional Product 
(GRP) of approximately 12 percent in 2003 and 2004, economic activity in Kaliningrad is high. 
In comparison with Russia, the average growth in the Russian Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 
2003 and 2004 was approximately 7 percent as illustrated by table 4.2.  
 
Figure 4.1: Economic development in Kaliningrad and Russia (annual GRP/GDP 
growth, %) 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Kaliningrad
Russia
 
 Source: Pan-European Institute (2006) 
 
Despite the high growth rates, Kaliningrad is still a poor region compared to other parts of 
Russia and the neighbouring EU countries in particular. That is to say that whereas the 
Lithuanian and Polish GDP per capita in 2004 were € 5,194 and € 5,113 respectively, 
Kaliningrad’s GRP per capita only amounted to € 2,011 in 2004, while the Russian GDP per 
capita was  € 3,170 (Liuhto, 2005/b:7). The considerable socio-economic differences between 
Kaliningrad and the neighbouring countries are problematic in the sense that they provide an 
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incentive to engage in smuggling activities. Not least, because the prices on cigarettes, alcoholic 
beverages and gasoline are approximately half in Kaliningrad compared to the neighbouring 
countries, smuggling activities are very profitable. Amber, which has a very high occurrence in 
Kaliningrad, is an even more profitable smuggling good, and as Burkart (2005:16) points out, 
smuggling is to some extend tolerated in some border areas in Poland adjacent to Kaliningrad as 
the activities compensates for the high degree of unemployment in the local communities.  
 
Altogether, the living standards in Kaliningrad are thus far from the standards in Lithuania and 
Poland, but it is nevertheless the ambition that Kaliningrad in a foreseeable future will reach the 
same level, and the SEZ is expected to be a strong contributor to reach this goal. A further 
means to help Kaliningrad “catch-up” with the surrounding countries and even out the socio-
economic gap is the Federal Special Target Program (Russian Federation, 2001). The Federal 
Special Purpose Program for the “Development of Kaliningrad Oblast for the Period prior to 
2010” was introduced in 2001 by the federal Russian authorities. The primary objective of the 
Special Purpose Program is:  
 
“To ensure that favourable conditions are set for a sustainable development of Kaliningrad 
Oblast in the social and economic areas, along the lines commensurable with those of 
neighbouring states and also to create investor-friendly environment in the region, thus 
bringing Russia and the European Union closer together” (ibid. 1). 
 
The program’s indicators of success state it as the ambition to increase the GRP 3.5 times by 
2010 and to attain an income level in the region, which is comparable to the neighbouring states 
(ibid.19). Furthermore, in order “to ensure Russia’s geostrategic interests in the Baltic Region”, 
the program aims at establishing partnerships with the Baltic States and the EU (ibid.). Judging 
from the ambitions of the program, it is very focused on avoiding a scenario where Kaliningrad 
is lacking behind its surroundings, and/or Kaliningrad is left in isolation in the Baltic Region. 
This concern is shared by the EU, as the neighbouring EU countries allegedly could risk to be 
affected negatively by the socio-economic problems in Kaliningrad (cf. Patten, 2001). Instead, 
the ambition is that Kaliningrad takes the position as a bridge-builder between Russia and the 
EU. Thus, the Special Purpose Program recognises the beneficial consequences for Kaliningrad 
by making use of its location “in-between” the territories of Russia and the EU, and to erase the 
socio-economic differences between Kaliningrad and its EU neighbours.  
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 The actual effects of the program are of course difficult to assess. Sander Huisman from the 
Centre for European Security Studies argues on the one hand that the Special Purpose Program 
has a lack of focus on “the real obstacles to growth (e.g. the absence of essential legislation and 
ineffective management)” (Huisman, 2002:29). Furthermore, the program is relying on federal 
funding, which initially hampered the positive effects as these were not allocated immediately. 
Professor at the Pan-European Institute, Kari Liuhto, on the other hand, accentuates the positive 
effects of the program and praises it for:  
 
“[…] already creating conditions for investments attraction and export-orientation 
production stimulation. The funds allocated by this program have not only social, but also 
stimulating economic importance (appropriation) for creating conditions necessary for 
successful regional development (primarily industrial and social infrastructures), as well as 
for support to modernize leading sectors of regional economy” (Liuhto, 2005/a:91).  
 
However, positive development in Kaliningrad is also caused by a significant increase in federal 
investments during the last few years – partly by funds allocated in relation to the celebration of 
Kaliningrad’s 750th anniversary in 2005 and partly by the construction of a major power plant in 
Kaliningrad. Furthermore, Kaliningrad as any other part of Russia has enjoyed the increased 
revenues deriving from the high oil prices on the world market and adding to this governor Boos 
has put a lot of efforts in reorganising the Regional Administration with the purpose of making 
the administration more efficient and cost-saving.15 Altogether, these circumstances have meant 
a significant improvement of the financial situation in Kaliningrad, which will – at some point – 
help to close the socio-economic gap to the neighbouring countries.  
 
4.1.3. Infrastructure 
As part of the CES’ objective to strengthen the economic cooperation between the EU and 
Russia, the promotion of complementary between the transport sectors and the gradual 
integration of transport networks are prioritised. For Kaliningrad, the integration of the road 
network with the neighbouring countries and mainland Russia is a necessity for the region’s 
economic survival, as the economic development in Kaliningrad is relying on the in- and outflow 
                                                 
15 I thank Leonid Sergeev for drawing my attention to these facts (Interview, September 14, 2006) 
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of people and goods. The need to integrate Kaliningrad’s infrastructure to the neighbouring 
countries is therefore also stated as an objective in the Federal Special Purpose Program for 
Kaliningrad (Russian Federation, 2001:20). Hence, Kaliningrad’s location “outside” mainland 
Russia means that the territory is not integrated in the Russian road network, and furthermore 
this integration with the mainland infrastructure is not within the competence of Russia as it 
requires transit through Lithuania or Poland. Likewise, the integration of Kaliningrad’s road 
network with the neighbouring countries is also dealt with as a matter of the region’s enclativity, 
which, as pointed out earlier, is in the competence of the EU. As such, a prerequisite for the 
development in Kaliningrad is integration in the transport networks of the surrounding 
countries, which inevitable must include the EU. 
 
As it is now, Kaliningrad is integrated in the Pan-European Transport Network (PETN) by 
Corridor I and Corridor IX and is therefore relatively easy to reach from other parts of the Baltic 
Region and Russia. Corridor I (Figure 4.2) is connecting Kaliningrad to Finland, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Poland and should make travel and freight easy in the Eastern parts of Baltic 
Region. However, as visas are required in order to enter Kaliningrad and due to the time-
consuming queues at Kaliningrad’s border, Kaliningrad is often bypassed in the north-south 
bounded traffic.16 Hence, the north and south bounded traffic are not obliged to pass through 
Kaliningrad, since the “Via Baltica” branch of Corridor I (Helsinki-Tallinn-Riga-Kaunas-
Warsaw) is not subject to the same territorial manifestations (i.e. border controls and  visas) as 
the “Via Hansaetica” branch of Corridor I (Riga-Kaliningrad-Gdansk).17  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 Problems concerning visas and border crossing will discussed in relation to the Common Spaces of Freedom, 
Security and Justice in chapter 4.2.  
17 Interestingly, the “Via Hansaetic” branch is named with reference to the Hanseatic League, which is well-known 
for establishing a network of merchants in the Baltic Sea Region in the 14th Century thereby fostering closer 
economic relations across the Baltic Sea.  
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Figure 4.2: Corridor I of the Pan-European Transport Network 
 
Source: ECMT website 
 
This means that the Russian enforcement of Kaliningrad’s territoriality is preventing the region 
from being a Pan-European “hub” even though passing through its territory in many cases 
provide the shortest travel route. This is obviously a barrier for incorporating Kaliningrad in the 
regional infrastructure, which – all things being equal – is making it more troublesome for 
everybody (especially people in Kaliningrad) to travel in the Baltic Region as well as it provides a 
barrier for trade between Kaliningrad and the neighbouring countries.  
 
Corridor IX of the PETN (Kaliningrad-Vilnius-Minsk-Kiev), which also passes through Kalinin-
grad, is of particular importance for Kaliningrad, as it provides the East-bound travel route in 
and out of Kaliningrad and connects with the “Via Baltica” branch of Corridor I (Figure 4.3). 
Furthermore, Corridor IX’s Kaliningrad-stretch is Kaliningrad’s main internal highway (Zhdanov 
et al., 2002:51).  
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Figure 4.3: Corridor IX of the Pan-European Transport Network 
 
Source: ECMT website 
 
Unfortunately, the Kaliningrad-stretches of the PETN are in a very poor condition and needs 
extensive renovation. In order to rectify this, the Corridor IX in Kaliningrad has been listed 
among the most important motorways in Russia in need of repair in the Presidential Program 
“Roads of Russia” (ibid.). Furthermore, as the PETN is a key priority for the EU, TACIS 
funding has been made available in order to modernise the roads.18 Such investments in 
Kaliningrad’s road network are of great importance if the region should benefit from the PETN. 
In fact, there is only one highway in Kaliningrad, which corresponds with international standards 
– even though the majority of the road network in Kaliningrad is comparable to the Russian 
                                                 
18 TACIS is an abbreviation of the EU-program “Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States”, and 
was introduced in 1991 in order to help countries in Central- and Eastern Europe with the transition from planned 
economy to marked economy. 
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average (RDA, 2006:12). As such, the conditions to integrate Kaliningrad’s roads with the roads 
of the neighbouring countries are present, but the infrastructural standards need to be upgraded.  
 
As regards to air traffic, Kaliningrad’s Khrabrova Airport also provides an unfulfilled potential 
for the region. Currently, there are a few direct international flights to the EU (Warsaw, Riga and 
Berlin) and most recently the airport has been opened up for four weekly flights to Copenhagen. 
The latter route is operated by “airBaltic”, which is one of the main flight operators in the Baltic 
Sea Region. The agreement with “airBaltic” was not least the result of governor Boos’ personal 
involvement, and indicates that the regional authorities acknowledge the importance of airborne 
traffic. Hence, if the authorities in Kaliningrad are genuine in their wish to attract economic 
activity to the region, a prerequisite is the accessibility by air, since this is one of the most 
commonly used means of transport among businesspeople. In fact, the focus on facilitating 
businesspeople was the primary argument for the president of “airBaltic”, Bertolt Flick, as the 
route was opened in September 2006 (Flick, 2006). 
 
4.1.4. Environmental Issues 
The CES also identifies the environment as a key-priority – not because environmental issues is 
thought to generate economic growth, but rather to ensure the economic growth is not achieved 
at the expense of environmental sustainability. The environment is a challenge to territorial 
states, which makes environmental issues particularly interesting in discussions about 
international cooperation. Hence, pollution is not confined by territorial state borders.19 
Furthermore, discussions about environmental issues are normally not perceived as interventions 
in sovereign matters and they are therefore not nearly as sensitive and politicised as other issues 
on the international agenda (Tassinari & Williams, 2003:50).  
 
The CES is especially mentioning the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership (NDEP) 
as an initiative, which should be taken into consideration in the implementation process. The 
NDEP stems from the Northern Dimension Initiative (NDI), and was establish by the European 
Council in Gothenburg in 2001. The purpose of the program is according to the Northern 
Dimension website to pool funding from IFIs, who is operating in North-West Russia and solve 
                                                 
19 E.g. the Baltic Drainage Basin encompasses parts of 14 countries, which means that the lack of sufficient 
environmental policies in one country potentially has an effect on up to 13 other countries. 
 - 40 -
the most pressing environmental cross-border problems. As such, the NDEP is recognising that 
environmental threats are not confined by territorial state borders and that a common effort is 
necessary in order so prevent pollution from spreading throughout the entire region. The 
Partnership has so far been quite successful in terms of involving the Russian authorities – 
something which often is pointed out as a difficult task. Hence, the NDEP support fund has 
received a substantial contribution from Russia, and the Russian authorities have generally been 
very supportive in the implementation of the program.  
 
The NDEP has 16 priority projects – out of which three are based in Kaliningrad, and 
Kaliningrad has already received a significant amount of finance from the Partnership. The three 
projects concern solid waste, wastewater and district heating and represent important 
investments as well as environmental benefits for Kaliningrad. Most recently, the Russian 
Ministry of Finance has proposed to establish a so-called project implementation unit in order to 
bring together stakeholders and professionals involved in the three projects so that the expertise 
gathered in the respective programs can be fully utilised. Furthermore, the intention is to increase 
the ownership and commitment among the local authorities, so that the effects of the projects 
are secured in a long-term perspective (NDEP, 2006:2). 
 
The NDEP shows that the environment is looked upon as a common space, which calls for 
common efforts by the EU and Russia. This indicates that the de-territorialised character of the 
environment not only foster cooperation across borders – it relies on cooperation across 
borders. Furthermore, as these issues are not as politicised as for example energy supply, 
cooperating within the field of the environment provides an added bonus as a confidence-
building measure. Kaliningrad has – within the framework of the NDEP – proved to be suitable 
for this type of cooperation. 
 
4.1.5. Summary 
Kaliningrad does not qualify as Common Economic Space in every respect (cf. the objectives 
identified in the Road Map). There are issues, which are “too big” for Kaliningrad as they require 
substantial legislative changes. However, in a number of areas, Kaliningrad is exposed to 
territorial strategies intended to utilise its potential as a bridge-builder between the EU and 
Russia. The primary intention behind these territorial strategies it to compensate Kaliningrad for 
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its detachment from mainland Russia, but if the EU and Russia agreed on coordinating their 
efforts, it would be possible to strengthen cooperation between the two, which would be in line 
with the objective stated in the Common Economic Spaces (CES) while maintaining the focus 
on Kaliningrad’s particular situation. 
 
The CES is focusing on creating a favourable business environment in order to secure economic 
growth in the EU and Russia. As demonstrated above, the establishment of an investor-friendly 
region has been high on the agenda in Kaliningrad for several years. This policy – initialised by 
the federal authorities – aims at fostering economic activity in Kaliningrad as a way of 
compensation for the disadvantages caused by Kaliningrad separation from mainland Russia. As 
such, the intention is to ensure that the socio-economic gap between Kaliningrad and the 
neighbouring countries is minimised – something which is also a priority for the EU. The most 
important initiatives have been the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) and the Federal Special Target 
Program. Whereas the latter is mostly to be considered as a federal subsidy, the SEZ can be 
characterised as a strategy intended to attract investors by offering a number of taxation and 
customs benefits. These investor-friendly policies makes Kaliningrad resemble a free-trade zone, 
which for a number of years has been emphasised as a prime objective in the EU-Russian 
relationship. The effects of the SEZ as well as the Federal Special Target Program are meanwhile 
contributing to a harmonisation of the socio-economic situation in Kaliningrad vis-à-vis the 
neighbouring countries. 
 
Kaliningrad’s geographic location furthermore makes the CES’ focus on transport of relevance 
for the region. Already, Kaliningrad is integrated in the Pan-European Transport Network 
(PETN), but because of the territorial restrictions at the borders, Kaliningrad is often bypassed 
by the traffic in the Baltic Sea Region. Furthermore, the roads in Kaliningrad are in a poor 
condition and require substantial investments in order to live up to the international standards. 
The proclaimed investments in the PETN as well as the intentions to modernise Kaliningrad’s 
road network means that steps are taken towards creating a common infrastructure in the Baltic 
Region, which is also taking into account Kaliningrad’s importance in this network. In the next 
section, we will look at the situation concerning border crossings and visa-regulation, which are 
prerequisites as regards to utilise the potential for integrating the transport network – including 
airborne traffic. For now, we can conclude that there is a possibility to integrate Kaliningrad’s 
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physical infrastructure with the EU and that both parties (the EU and Russia) recognise this 
potential.  
 
Finally, Kaliningrad has proven to be a successful test region for environmental cooperation 
within the framework of the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership (NDEP). 
Environmental issues are characterised by being de-territorialised and therefore solving 
environmental problems calls for common efforts. Such common efforts have been initiated in 
Kaliningrad, which, besides benefiting the environment and fostering investments, has provided 
positive results in terms of establishing a partnership involving both Russian and EU 
stakeholders. 
 
4.2. Kaliningrad and the Common Space of Freedom, Security and 
Justice 
The Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice (CSFSJ) is perhaps the most interesting 
one from the perspective of this study, since it draws attention to the much invoked objective 
about building “a new Europe without dividing lines” (EU & Russia, 2005:21). The key-issues 
with relevance to the CSFSJ relates to the movement and readmission of persons; border issues; 
migration; asylum policies; terrorism and organised crime; travel documents; money laundering; 
trafficking in drugs, human beings, stolen vehicles and items of cultural and historic value; 
corruption; and the judicial system (ibid. 23-34). Altogether, these issues are summarizing very 
explicitly what territoriality is about – namely attempts to control people by the exercise of 
control over a geographic area (Sack, 1986:19). Furthermore, these manifestations of power are 
among some of the most important territorial practises as they communicate and enforce 
territories. The EU and Russia’s intention to cooperate on these issues is thus one of the most 
apparent indications of the objective to work towards territorial rapprochement. 
 
There are several of the elements, which are of particular interest in the context of Kaliningrad – 
not least as regards to the movement of persons and border issues in general. These issues are 
covered by the element of freedom, where the objective is described as the facilitation of: 
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 “[…] human contacts and travel between the EU and Russia, ensure smooth legal border 
crossings and lawful stays on their territories, as well as to work together to tackle illegal 
migration and illegal cross-border activities” (EU & Russia, 2005:23).  
 
As such, the purpose of the CSFSJ is that the territorial strategies of Russia and the EU are 
focusing on territorial strategies of inclusion and cooperation instead of exclusion and 
sovereignty. As demonstrated in chapter 2, Kaliningrad’s geographical location accentuates 
discussions about sovereignty, as Kaliningrad’s territory, which falls under Russian sovereignty, is 
influenced the territoriality of the EU – especially as regards to the movement of people and 
goods. Hence, Kaliningrad’s detachment from the mainland means that Kaliningrad is not only 
relying on special transit arrangements in order to connect to mainland Russia, Kaliningrad is 
also depending on smooth border arrangements with the neighbouring countries. As regards to 
the idea of a pilot region for cooperation, Kaliningrad’s size and relatively short border line is of 
overriding importance as it makes Kaliningrad a suitable place to test the issues presented in the 
CSFSJ, since eventual problems would be small-scale and manageable. 
 
4.2.1. Border Crossings 
International borders provide the most explicit manifestation of the large-scale connection 
between politics and geography. As such, borders – or boundaries – symbolise the political 
institutionalisation of territories and territorialities and constitute per definition separation 
(Newman & Paasi, 1998:186-191). Obviously, this means that the CSFSJ aspirations to avoid 
separation and intensify human contacts must include discussions on border issues. Currently, 
border management is handled very differently by the EU and Russia and the differences also 
concern the borders between Kaliningrad and their neighbouring countries.  
 
The Polish and Lithuanian border control is based on the EU’s Integrated Border Management 
System, which stipulates a very high degree of coordination between all the relevant authorities 
(i.e. border guards, customs authorities, traffic police etc.) in order to provide the basis for fast 
and competent decisions. These regulations have been implemented in Poland and Lithuania 
during the last years and are part of the two countries’ preparations for entering in the Schengen 
Area. The Russian border control is, on the other hand, structured completely different, as the 
involved authorities have very defined tasks with a low degree of flexibility and without cross-
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cutting competences. This has the disadvantage that the border control first of all is very slow 
and troublesome, and secondly is rather ineffective compared to the Polish and Lithuania side.20 
Heinz Burkhart argues that whereas the Polish/Lithuanian border control are focusing on the 
common EU border regulation and internal harmonisation, the Russia legislation is much more 
focused on security and exclusion, which makes the two rather difficult to integrate (Burkhart, 
2005:19).  
 
In order to increase human contacts across the EU-Russian border, the CSFSJ seeks to intensify 
discussions on border management and improve common border crossing points (EU & Russia, 
2005:26). Until now, one of the main priorities for the EU has been to modernise the border 
crossings between Kaliningrad and Lithuania/Poland. The effort should – according to the EU’s 
Northern Dimension website – be seen in continuation of the transit agreement, since effective 
border crossings are needed in order to ensure that the transit in and out of Kaliningrad runs as 
smoothly as possible and to facilitate cross-border contact. A less positive judgment would claim 
that the EU’s focus on modernising the Kaliningrad’s borders is part of the preparations for 
including Lithuania and Poland in Schengen, which necessitate stricter control at the “external 
borders” in order to avoid cross-border threats.  
 
The technical assistance from the EU under the TACIS programme has so far amounted to € 11 
million and aims at improving the border crossing infrastructure in Kaliningrad. Furthermore, in 
the coming years an additional € 20 million will be spent on the purpose. The four priority 
border crossings are: 
 
• Bagrationovsk, which is the main freight border terminal between Kaliningrad and 
Poland. The border crossing also handles traffic coming from Germany on the way to 
the Baltic States. 
• Chernychevsky at Nesterov, which is located on the corridor that links Kaliningrad to 
Russia through the territories of Lithuania and Belarus. Chernychevsky is considered to 
be the most important border crossing in Kaliningrad. 
• Mamonovo, which is a crossing at the Polish border. 
• Sovetsk, which connects Kaliningrad to Lithuania, and further on, to Riga in Latvia. 
                                                 
20 For a detailed description of the divergence between the border control at the two sides please see Burkhart 
(2005:11-14) 
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 Figure 4.4: Main border crossings in Kaliningrad 
 
Source: BUP 
 
By establishing modern and efficient border crossings, Kaliningrad avoids the risk of being 
completely bypassed by the development of the European infrastructure, which, as pointed out 
earlier, is a mayor priority for the EU in order to integrate the transport networks of the new EU 
member states.  
 
4.2.2 Visa-free regime  
The CSFSJ underscores the long-term objective for the EU and Russia to create a mutual visa-
free travel regime, which often is articulated as the perspective as regards to the movement of 
people and readmission. At the EU-Russia Summit in London in October 2005, the leaders 
concluded the negotiations on mutual agreements on visa facilitation and readmission, which 
were subsequently signed in Sochi in May 2006. According to the Austrian Presidency who 
signed the agreement on behalf of the EU: 
 
“The two agreements will open the way for easier contacts across the European continent, 
while creating conditions for effectively fighting illegal immigration. The particular 
importance of the ongoing cooperation to tackle common challenges for both the EU and 
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Russia, like terrorism, drugs and organised crime, and the need to improve border 
management and migration control was underscored” (Schüssel, 2006). 
 
As such, progress has already been made in the field of visa facilitation and readmission. There 
is, however, still a long way to the proclaimed visa-free travel regime, but it is not least in relation 
to this that Kaliningrad provides an interesting test case. In fact, there have already been 
proposals that could pave the way for a visa-free regime in Kaliningrad. In 2003, the deputy of 
Kaliningrad’s Regional Duma, Vladimir Ezhikov, raised a proposal concerning the possibility for 
EU citizens and citizens of Lithuania and Poland to enter Kaliningrad without a visa. According 
to Ezhikov, the cancellation of visas for citizens of EU member states would create favourable 
conditions for Kaliningrad to develop social, economic and cultural links to the neighbouring 
states (Ezhikov, 2003). The proposal received support in the regional Duma, but did not achieve 
the necessary backing by the federal authorities in Moscow. The response from the federal 
authorities is an indication of the fact that the competency of regulating Kaliningrad’s “external 
relations” lies with the federal authorities. Hence, Kaliningrad is not a tiny state, but a separated 
part of a larger territory, and the regional authorities are therefore incapable of deciding matters 
about the conditions for foreign citizens’ possibility of entering Russian territory, which is a 
matter of state sovereignty.  
 
Furthermore, Ezhikov’s proposal had another feature, which contests the traditional way of 
regulating international relations – it was a one-sided proposal and was not based on reciprocity. 
Therefore, while citizens coming from Lithuania, Poland and EU member states would be able 
to travel into Kaliningrad without visas, citizens of Kaliningrad who were travelling the other 
way would still need to apply for visas. At first, this sounds like an unfavourable deal for the 
Russian authorities. However, Ezhikov’s argumentation for the proposal focused on creating 
favourable conditions to develop social, economic and cultural links to the neighbouring states, 
which would allegedly benefit Kaliningrad without including the principle of reciprocity. If we 
for a moment turn the attention towards what has been agreed between the EU and Russia 
within the framework of the CSFSJ, we will see that the recently signed visa agreement between 
the EU and Russia states its purpose: 
 
“[…] to facilitate people to people contacts as an important condition for a steady development 
of economic, humanitarian, cultural, scientific and other ties, by facilitating the issuing of visas to 
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the citizens of the Russian Federation and the European Union on the basis of reciprocity” (EU 
& Russia, 2006:1) 
 
As such, the argument is almost the same as in Ezhikov’s proposal – with the notable difference 
that the agreement is based on reciprocity (and applies to the entire territories of both the EU 
and Russia). The intention of the CSFSJ is thus similar to the regional proposal, which is 
suggesting that Ezhikov’s idea could be implemented in Kaliningrad as a part of the CSFSJ. This 
is easily administrated, as Kaliningrad is separated from the mainland, and EU-citizens would 
therefore not be able to travel to mainland Russia without applying for a visa. Furthermore, such 
an initiative would without doubt facilitate human contacts across borders as called upon in the 
context of the CSFSJ. In terms of reciprocity, this has earlier proven not to be an obstacle for 
agreements concerning Kaliningrad, as we will see below. 
 
4.2.3. Facilitated Transit 
As previously pointed out, one of the primary obstacles prior to the enlargement of the EU in 
2004 was related to the transit of people and goods in and out of Kaliningrad. Until then, travel 
back and forth from Kaliningrad to mainland Russia could be done unrestricted without visas. 
However, with the enlargement approaching, this traffic would soon be occurring on the 
territory of the EU – and in a foreseeable future through the Schengen Area. Therefore, in 
November 2002 the EU and Russia agreed on the so-called Facilitated Transit Document (FTD) 
and the Facilitated Rail Transit Document (FRTD). The FTD is allowing Russian citizens to 
travel back and forth from Kaliningrad by obtaining a FTD that permits multi-entry transit 
through the territory of Lithuania by car or bus, while the FRTD enables single return trips by 
rail on Russian transit trains. Both the FTD and the FRTD are issued promptly and made 
available at no or very low cost (€ 5 for the FTD; no charge for the FRTD). The FTD can be 
acquired at Lithuanian consulates, while the FRTD is issued on the train to Russia.21 It should be 
noted that transit through Lithuanian territory is not unreserved. Thus, according to the Joint 
Statement on Transit between the EU and Russia:  
 
                                                 
21 A prerequisite, though, is that passengers provide the necessary personal information, when the ticket is purchased 
in advance. 
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”The parties recognise that the transit regime will not infringe upon the sovereign right of 
the Republic of Lithuania to exercise the necessary controls and to refuse entry into its 
territory” (EU & Russia, 2002:1).22  
 
Therefore, even though the FTD and the FRTD are diminishing the obstacles for Russians, who 
travel to and from Kaliningrad, neither the FTD nor the FRTD violates Lithuanian sovereignty. 
Rather, the provisions laid out in the two transit documents indicate a mutual recognition 
between the EU and Russia that agreements in the area of visa/readmission are fundamental 
necessities for Kaliningrad, and that both the EU and Russia are willing to find a common 
solution to this need – even though it means to put in force extraordinary regulations, such as 
the FTD and the FRTD.  
 
The effect of two documents is that the obstacles presented by Kaliningrad’s exclave status are 
minimised (without bringing reciprocity into play), so that the freedom of movement for 
Russians within (and between) Russian territory is preserved to some extent even though this 
means crossing another territory. Both sides (the EU and Russia) indicate that they are satisfied 
with the way the FRTD operates, and during the first 32 months, one million FRTDs were 
issued. On the other hand the FTD is less successful – perhaps because they are not available 
free of charge (Vinokurov, 2006). The documents show that the parties have a flexible approach 
when dealing with Kaliningrad’s isolation from mainland Russia. However, despite enabling 
transport between Kaliningrad and mainland Russia, neither the FTD nor the FRTD are easing 
human contacts and travel between the EU and Russia.  
 
Instead, the EU (or rather individual member states) has taken initiatives with the purpose of 
making it less troublesome for citizens in Kaliningrad to receive visas for the EU. Poland, 
Lithuania and Sweden (and before long also Germany) have established general consulates in 
Kaliningrad, and with the provisions laid out in the Common Consular Instruction of the EU’s 
Schengen acquis, the consulate of one EU member state are allowed to issue visas on behalf of 
another member state. That way, citizens in Kaliningrad who wish to travel to Denmark can 
                                                 
22 Furthermore, as of 1 January 2005, FTD and FRTD need to be accompanied with a passport valid for 
international travel in order to allow transit through Lithuanian territory. As such, this proviso is an indication that 
facilitated transit through Lithuania is not to be considered as travel through a Russian corridor but rather as travel 
or transportation through foreign territory. 
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apply for a visa at the Swedish General Consulate in Kaliningrad.23 Earlier, such visas could only 
be issued at the Danish General Consulate in Sankt Petersburg or at the Danish Embassy in 
Moscow, which meant a significant obstacle to citizens of Kaliningrad in terms of requiring a 
Danish visa. As Vinokurov points out, it is normally not considered to be a big problem that 
visas are proscribed for international travel. The problem is to obtain a visa, as this is quite often 
a troublesome (and for some, costly) process (Vinokurov, 2004/b:32). The decision to establish 
EU consulates in Kaliningrad contributes to overcome the cumbersome process of obtaining a 
visa and travel to the EU. 
 
4.2.4. Summary 
The enforcement of borders in Kaliningrad is not only suitable for increasing the cooperation 
between the EU and Russia, it is furthermore a necessity for Kaliningrad that the enforcement 
include both the EU and Russia. In a strict sense, Kaliningrad is an isolated part of Russia and in 
order to overcome this isolation, Kaliningrad relies on visa and transit agreement with the EU. 
Such agreements entail the potential to diminish the degree of Kaliningrad’s detachment form 
mainland Russia, while benefiting from the attachment to the EU. This could very well be done 
within the framework of the Common Space for Security, Freedom and Justice (CSFSJ). 
 
The CSFSJ is basically concerned with making the enforcement of boundaries between the EU 
and Russia less strict. Therefore, the objectives in the CSFSJ are particularly relevant for 
Kaliningrad, as all of Kaliningrad’s territorial land-borders are EU-Russian borders. The special 
situation of Kaliningrad has already meant that a number of initiatives have been launched in 
order to minimise the obstacles deriving from the geographical location.  
 
The border crossings connecting Kaliningrad with the neighbouring countries is first and 
foremost a priority in terms of facilitating increased human contacts and travel across the 
territorial borders. As it is now, the management of borders are dealt with very differently by the 
EU and Russia. Therefore, the EU is supporting the modernisation of Kaliningrad’s border 
crossings so that transit and human contacts are dealt with more efficient. This is, as earlier 
pointed out, a necessity if Kaliningrad is to be integrated with the neighbouring countries in the 
                                                 
23 At the present stage, the Swedish Consulate General in Kaliningrad is handling applications for visas to Finland, 
the Netherlands, Norway and (of cause) Sweden. Applications for visas to Denmark will be handled by the consulate 
by the end of 2006.  
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Pan-European Transport Network. As such, territorial rapprochement must include coordinating 
the enforcement of “external” borders in order to facilitate eased cross-border contact. Fewer 
obstacles at the territorial borders mean that the incentive to cross the borders is considerably 
increased, which will diminish the territorial “exclusion” of Kaliningrad vis-à-vis the EU.  
 
This has already (to some degree) been achieved vis-à-vis mainland Russia by the two documents 
on Facilitated Transit (FTD and FRTD). Hence, the FTD and the FRTD are designed to 
minimise the obstacles generated by Kaliningrad’s geographical isolation from mainland Russia. 
This means that the degree of separation and restrictions on free movement within the territory 
of Russia, which Poland and especially Lithuania represent, are somewhat avoided. The 
Facilitated Transit agreements are remarkable in the sense that they are not based on reciprocity. 
As such, they are unconditional and do not depend on a similar arrangement for the counterpart. 
This flexible arrangement has been a success so far and the lessons learned from this experience 
could be utilized in other areas – e.g. freight transport through Kaliningrad by the Pan-European 
Transport Network. 
 
On the other hand, attempts to allow visa-free travel in and out of Kaliningrad have so far 
proven unsuccessful. The proposal about visa-free travel from the EU to Kaliningrad, which 
would allegedly benefit Kaliningrad’s social, economic and cultural links to the neighbouring 
countries, was turned down. The proposal could have been an important step towards 
diminishing any existing and/or potential dividing lines between the EU and Russia, but was 
lacking the important element of reciprocity. As a long term perspective, visa-free travel 
obviously has to include reciprocity, but on the short-term, it could benefit Kaliningrad if the 
restrictions on entry into Kaliningrad were eased by allowing some degree of visa-free entry from 
the EU.  
 
Kaliningrad’s size and short border line would make visa-free travel relatively easy to implement 
and enforce, and would be a considerable step towards making the territory of Kaliningrad a 
territory of inclusion. Hence, from the perspective of this study, Kaliningrad is very suitable in 
terms of being a pilot region for the objectives in the CSFSJ – especially as regards to creating a 
visa-free regime. 
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4.3. Kaliningrad and the Common Space of External Security 
The Common Space of External Security (CSES) is the only “Space”, which is not applicable to 
Kaliningrad. This is primarily owned to the fact that the CSES’s spatial focus is orientated 
fundamentally different than the three other Common Spaces. Hence, whereas the other 
Common Spaces are focusing on alignment of “internal” matters within and between the 
territories of the EU and Russia, the CSES is dealing with “external” issues outside the territories 
of the EU and Russia.  
 
Within the scope of the CSES, the primary topics are the mutual commitment to strengthen the 
dialogue and cooperate on the international scene; fight terrorism; cooperate in terms of non-
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery as well as to strengthen 
export control regimes and disarmament; cooperate in crisis management; and to cooperate in 
the field of civil protection (EU & Russia, 2005:36). The means by which this agenda is met is 
primarily through different international forums, such as the Council of Europe, the OSCE, G8 
and the UN. Therefore, in order to comply with the targets set out in the CSES, the parties do 
not need to adjust inwards. In stead, they concentrate on combating threats coming from outside 
their territories. This means that in stead of working towards blurring the territorial sovereignty, 
which is the consequence of the other Common Spaces, the CSES urges to maintain or even 
strengthen the territorial strategies opposing external threats and enabling global action. 
 
Kaliningrad has little – if anything – to offer in this respect. Cooperation between the EU and 
Russia within the field of external security would therefore not gain anything from involving 
Kaliningrad – nor would Kaliningrad gain from the EU and Russia’s cooperation on external 
security. 
 
4.4. Kaliningrad and the Common Space of Research and Education 
The purpose of the Common Space of Research and Education (CSRE) is to reinforce people-
to-people contacts, promote common values and contribute to increase the competitiveness of 
the EU and Russian economies. As such, it follows some of the objectives set out by the CES 
and the CSFSJ, while assuming a “subordinated” character in order to contribute to the 
fulfilment of the CES’ objective to strengthen economic ties. The logic behind the CSRE is thus 
to utilize human resources and create so-called “knowledge societies” with the purpose of 
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common (economic) benefit. Therefore, a number of educational undertakings are to be made in 
order to stimulate innovative project and research and development – including the 
establishment of the European Higher Education Area (EHEA), which was convened by the 
European Ministers of Education in Bologna in June 1999. Below, I will argue that Kaliningrad is 
not only a suitable location for testing cooperation within the field of education, research and 
culture, initiatives in Kaliningrad have already provided positive results in these areas. 
 
4.4.1. Research and Education 
Cooperation within the field of education and higher learning has been high on the agenda in the 
Baltic Sea Region since the early 1990s, and during the Second Ministerial Session in the CBSS in 
Helsinki in March 1993, it was decided to establish the “EuroFaculty”. According to the Statutes 
of the EuroFaculty: 
 
“The EuroFaculty is established to assist in the retraining of teachers; curriculum 
development; and, the education and training of new professionals in the disciplines of Law, 
Economics, Business Administration and Public Administration, in the Baltic States and at 
selected universities in Russia” (CBSS, 1994). 
 
The overall strategy behind the EuroFaculty is thus to introduce standards and programs (i.e. 
core curriculum, administrative staff and teaching resources etc.) in accordance with the 
standards in universities in Denmark, Finland, Germany, Norway and Sweden. Besides serving 
an urgent need for educating skilled labour in the early years after the independence in the three 
Baltic States in order to facilitate the transformation to market economy, the EuroFaculty has 
established comparable standards, which potentially could foster closer cooperation and 
exchange of knowledge among the universities (and the societies) in the Baltic Sea Region.24
 
Between 1994 and 1997 a minor pilot program within the auspices of EuroFaculty was 
conducted at Kaliningrad State University, but it was not until 2000 that Kaliningrad EuroFaculty 
was inaugurated with the intention to advise the Kaliningrad State University. In the opening 
speech, the Chairman of the Committee of Senior Officials of the CBSS, Dr. Hans-Jürgen 
Heimsoeth stated: 
                                                 
24 To start with three universities were selected for the program – Tartu University (Estonia), University of Latvia 
(Latvia) and Vilnius University (Lithuania). 
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 “The EuroFaculty is a factor connecting the Baltic Sea region together, and can […] become 
a communications port. It should help the Russian oblast of Kaliningrad and its university 
become academically and economically integrated into the region. The Kaliningrad area 
stands to benefit from participating in regional cooperation, as does Russia as a whole” 
(Heimsoeth, 2000). 
  
So far, within this framework, Kaliningrad State University has been provided with up-to-date 
equipment and support for organizing student and staff exchanges as well as hosting 
international conferences. Furthermore, Kaliningrad State University is now actively engaged in 
the dialogue with the educational community in Europe and beyond, which according to the 
University’s website “helps it to maintain a strong position in the process of creating a common 
European educational area”, which have “enabled Kaliningrad University to become one of the 
leading universities in Russia”. Director of the Nordic Council of Minister’s office in 
Kaliningrad, Arne Grove, is specifically identifying the EuroFaculty program as a very successful 
initiative in terms of fostering cooperation between EU (member states) and Russia.  
 
The EuroFaculty is therefore to a large extend a Nordic/Baltic/Russian frontrunner of the 
CSRE, whose objective is to adopt comparable degree, promoting academic mobility, 
cooperation in the provision of the learning quality and integrating curricula at the higher 
education institutions (EU & Russia, 2005:49).  
 
4.4.2. Cultural Exchange 
In the field of cultural exchange there have also been several initiatives. One of these is the “Ars-
Baltica”, which is a CBSS initiative. Ars-Baltica is a forum for multilateral cultural cooperation 
within the Baltic Sea Region with an emphasis on common projects. The main priorities are given 
to art, culture and cultural history with the intention to enhance a cultural identity in the Baltic 
Sea Region in a European context. The Ars-Baltica website states that the goal is to implement 
common projects, which help to establish sustainable regional networks of individuals and 
organisations. Some of these projects are also of direct relevance for Kaliningrad. Below I will 
give an example of an Ars-Baltica project, which has been initiated in Kaliningrad. 
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The “Baltic corridor” is a long-term project and takes place in Kaliningrad in cooperation with 
other cultural communities around the Baltic Sea in order to avoid/overcome cultural isolation 
of Kaliningrad. The name of the project refers to the former German imperial road No 1 (A1) 
between Berlin and Konigsberg, which is strongly associated with World War II. According to 
the National Centre of Contemporary Arts in Kaliningrad (NCCA), who coordinates the project, 
the aim is to transform the “corridor of war” into a “corridor of peace” by means of cultural 
exchange and cooperation. As such, the Baltic Corridor is not only a matter of cooperation, but 
also an attempt to redefine the geopolitical affiliations in the Baltic Sea Region, which has a 
rather conflicting and antagonistic past – to say the least. Therefore, the mission of the project is: 
 
“[…] to facilitate social and cultural development and rapprochement of EU and Russia through the 
creation of a single cultural space, including the Kaliningrad region, west Lithuania, northern 
regions of Poland and the neighbouring German territories” (NCCA website, emphasis 
added). 
 
Thus, in practise the Baltic Corridor brings together cultural institutions and professionals in 
Kaliningrad with similar institutions and professionals in the three EU member states Lithuania, 
Germany and Poland. The intention about facilitating rapprochement between the EU and 
Russia could just as well have been a paragraph in the four Common Spaces. The core issue, 
however, is that Kaliningrad is the cooperative “hub” in the project, and that the project is meant 
to benefit both cultural institutions in Kaliningrad as well as – on a larger scale – cultural 
cooperation between the EU and Russia by joining efforts across state borders. 
 
4.4.3. Summary 
Although cooperation in the field of economy, visa-free travel and external security to some 
extend can be considered to entail a greater potential as regards to territorial rapprochement, 
coordination within the field of education, research and culture should not be underestimated.  
 
As such, educational and cultural cooperation is not as sensitive as other practises of territoriality. 
Most notably, this is owned to the fact that issues concerning sovereignty are not accentuated by 
this type of cooperation. Hence, besides serving the purpose of facilitating cross-border 
cooperation and increased human contacts, these issues provide an important element of 
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confidence-building, which is an essential component of cooperation. Furthermore, as noted by 
Michael Emerson, initiatives, which fall under the CSRE have a long-term potential as a way for 
the EU and Russia to “[…] converge in terms of mindsets and political values perceived across 
society as a whole” (Emerson, 2004:3). 
 
Thus, while being small-scale and uncontroversial parts of the territorial rapprochement between 
the EU and Russia, the EuroFaculty and Ars-Baltica have provided successful examples of 
cooperation between the EU and Russia in the territorial context of Kaliningrad. 
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5. Kaliningrad as a Pilot Region – Barriers and Possibilities 
 
 
As noted in the introduction, from a formal geographical perspective Kaliningrad is “inside” the 
EU and “outside” Russia, while being “outside” the EU and “inside” Russia from the 
perspective of political and jurisdictional sovereignty. Interestingly, it could be noted that 
Kaliningrad is in fact very close to Europe’s geographical centre (measured from the Atlantic to the 
Urals), as this centre is located in Lithuania about 25 kilometres north of the capital Vilnius 
(Tassinari, 2004:iii). However, Kaliningrad is far from Europe’s political centre or rather, far from 
Europe’s political centres, which – from the perspective of this study – are constituted by the EU 
(Brussels) and Russia (Moscow). This geopolitical paradox accentuates Kaliningrad’s inside-
outside predicament and is in many ways the reason why I chose to focus on Kaliningrad in the 
thesis. Hence, the purpose of this study has been to analyse if, and how, the paradox can be dealt 
with. As such, this study has analysed the possibility of making Kaliningrad the political centre of 
attention for the EU and Russia by turning Kaliningrad into a pilot region for cooperation 
between the EU and Russia – within the framework of the four Common Spaces. 
 
The previous chapters have shown that the territory of Kaliningrad is affected by the 
territorialities of both Russia and the EU. Hence, the adduced argument in chapter 2 suggested 
that the development in Kaliningrad is relying on alignment of the EU and Russia’s territorial 
strategies in general and towards Kaliningrad in particular. It has also been argued that the 
agenda set by the four Common Spaces is a significant step towards creating overlapping 
territories and thus alignment of the EU and Russia’s territorial strategies. Furthermore, chapter 
4 demonstrated that Kaliningrad provides a suitable location to test cooperation between the EU 
and Russia in the context of the four Common Spaces, as it was showed that several existing 
initiatives in Kaliningrad correspond with the objectives set by the four Common Spaces. 
Therefore, not only could cooperation in Kaliningrad within the framework of the four 
Common Spaces test the limits and possibilities of cooperation between the EU and Russia in 
general, Kaliningrad would also benefit immensely from such an undertaking. 
 
On the basis of the findings up until now, the present chapter is designed to discuss the barriers 
and possibilities of turning Kaliningrad into a pilot region for cooperation between the EU and 
Russia within the framework of the four Common Spaces. For that purpose, I will compare the 
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results provided by the previous chapters in order to come up concrete suggestions for what 
should be done in order to make Kaliningrad a pilot region for cooperation. 
 
5.1. The Clash of Territoriality 
The territoriality of the EU as well as Russia’s territoriality both has an influence on the territory 
of Kaliningrad. The most obvious example of this is the enforcement of external boundaries as 
the movement of people in and out of Kaliningrad is depending on the degree of “openness” of 
the EU’s external borders. Furthermore, the Russian enforcement of Kaliningrad’s borders 
restricts the movement of people and goods to Kaliningrad from the neighbouring countries, 
which – besides hampering the tourist industry – is limiting human contacts and trade relations 
across the border. Another very important aspect of the territoriality of both the EU and Russia 
is trade regulations, as these are an essential way of exercising control within and to some degree 
beyond the two territories. That is to say that the conditions for economic operators doing 
business within – and between – territories are central parts of territoriality as these conditions 
are defining who are allowed to sell their goods to Russian or EU consumers as well as what kind 
of goods are allowed to be sold.  
 
Kaliningrad is caught up in this “clash of territorialities”. The region’s isolation from the rest of 
Russia and its strong resemblance to a tiny state makes Kaliningrad very dependent on 
interaction with the neighbouring countries and – of course – integration with mainland Russia. 
Kaliningrad cannot survive in isolation politically, socially or economically. The Special 
Economic Zone (SEZ) and the Federal Special Target Program are accordingly designed to 
compensate Kaliningrad for the disadvantages arising from the isolation from mainland Russia as 
the benefits deriving from the two initiatives are meant to ensure that Kaliningrad survives 
economically. The SEZ has had the effect that Kaliningrad primary economic relations are 
directed towards the mainland, as the SEZ gives economic operators an incentive to produce 
goods to the Russian market. Under normal circumstances, this seems like a “natural” way of 
prioritising the production in Kaliningrad by orientating the regional industry towards the 
territory of which Kaliningrad is a part of – namely the territory of Russia. However, Kaliningrad 
is not a normal part of the Russian territory and instead of utilising the benefits of Kaliningrad’s 
territorial abnormality, the SEZ and the Federal Special Target Program strive to maintain 
territorial compliance and alignment vis-à-vis Russia.  
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 The new law on the SEZ is supposedly meant to benefit Kaliningrad’s export to the 
neighbouring countries, but according to the former Head of the Budget and Finance Committee 
of Kaliningrad’s regional administration, Leonid Sergeev, the companies in Kaliningrad are not 
capable of competing with companies in the EU on equal terms as regards to quality. 
Furthermore, the EU tariffs imposed on goods coming from outside the EU add additional costs 
for companies from Kaliningrad who wishes to export their goods to the EU (Interview, 
September 14, 2006). Thus, even though the new law on the SEZ is meant to make Kaliningrad’s 
economy more export-oriented towards the EU, this seems unlikely to happen (at least in the 
short-term), as the companies in Kaliningrad have been accustomed to satisfy the demand for 
goods from the mainland in terms of price and quality, and because EU tariffs on imported 
goods provide a barrier for exporting goods from Kaliningrad. This leads us to the role of the 
territoriality of the EU, which is not allowing preferential treatment to companies from 
Kaliningrad. Hence, from the perspective of the EU, Kaliningrad is a normal part of Russia and 
therefore companies from Kaliningrad are not given special privileges such as eased export 
tariffs. This means that the EU is neither pursuing to utilise the location of Kaliningrad to 
establish a special trade regime either. 
 
Likewise, in terms of movement of people and goods, Kaliningrad is compensated for its 
isolation from mainland Russia. These issues are within the competence of the EU as they 
concern Kaliningrad’s enclativity and the means for compensation are constituted by the 
Facilitated Transit Document (FTD) and the Facilitated Rail Transit Document (FRTD). The 
FTD and the FRTD are designed to minimise the obstacles stemming from the geographical 
detachment from Russia imposed on the citizens from Kaliningrad. Obviously, Kaliningrad’s 
location “outside” Russia poses a problem in the sense that Russian citizens are prohibited from 
travelling freely within the territory of Russia. The FTD and the FRTD are ways to enable the 
citizens of Kaliningrad to maintain physical contact with their relatives in Russia as well as to 
transport goods to and from mainland Russia, while at the same time the FTD and the FRTD 
preserve Lithuania’s sovereignty. However, in spite the compensation offered by the FTD and 
the FRTD, the agreements underscore that Kaliningrad is excluded from the territory of EU (in 
this case Lithuania), while on the other hand enabling Kaliningrad to remain included in the 
territory of Russia. It is not my intention to criticise this arrangement, I am merely pointing out 
that the FTD and the FRTD are not “avoiding dividing lines” as proscribed by the four 
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Common Spaces. Rather, the FTD and the FRTD preserve the dividing lines and territorial 
exclusion between the EU and Russia, even though the arrangement overcomes an obstacle 
concerning the exercise of sovereignty by allowing transit through Lithuania. 
 
Altogether, it seems that the EU and Russia have adopted an approach to the “Kaliningrad-
question” that focuses on damage-control. Hence, even though most of the initiatives described in 
this study allegedly are concerned with fostering cooperation between the EU and Russia, the 
primary objective is to compensate Kaliningrad for the disadvantages of being an exclave 
detached from Russia, rather than investing in Kaliningrad’s advantages of being an enclave 
attached to the EU. These advantages are particularly apparent within the scope of the CSFSJ, as 
Kaliningrad’s geographical location and short border line make it relatively easy to implement a 
visa-free regime. This study suggests that by making Kaliningrad a pilot region for cooperation 
between the EU and Russia, Kaliningrad will provide a window of opportunity in the EU-Russian 
relationship. Hence, by pursuing territorial rapprochement and inclusion in the context of 
Kaliningrad, Kaliningrad may no longer represent “a clash of territoriality”. 
 
5.2. Towards Common Territoriality 
In the introduction to this study, I referred to an article by the former EU commissioner for 
external relations, Christopher Patten (Patten, 2001). In the article Patten raised his concern 
about so-called soft-security threats (e.g. pollution, organised crime, socio-economic problems 
etc.) as these are not confined by territorial borders. What accentuated Patten’s concern was the 
presence of Kaliningrad on – what was soon to be – EU territory, which implied that the 
development “inside” Kaliningrad could affect the situation “outside” Kaliningrad (e.g. the EU). 
This concern indicates a reorientation as regards to the traditional perception of territories. 
Hence, even though the practise of territoriality occupy and enforce territories, there are 
limitations of the degree of exclusion imposed by territoriality as some threats and challenges 
have a non-territorial character. Therefore, Patten argued, some challenges are better dealt with 
by joining efforts and engage in cross-border cooperation.  
 
The four Common Spaces between the EU and Russia are an important tool to deal with 
common territorial and non-territorial challenges. As such, the four Common Spaces are 
intended to coordinate the EU and Russia’s efforts in order to deal effectively with international 
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trade, international terrorism and pollution as well as benefiting from research and education, 
freedom of movement and human contacts across borders. These are all matters, which the 
territorial state from a conventional perspective is incapable or insufficient of handling. Hence, 
the primary and original function of the territorial state was to prevent conflict by entering in a 
system of territorially defined, fixed, and mutually exclusive geographical units of legitimate 
domination (Ruggie, 1993:151). However, today’s challenges are not necessarily territorially fixed, 
which has meant a reorientation towards the creation of territories of inclusion. The best 
example of this is the development in (and of) the EU, which has been coined the “unbundling 
of territoriality” (ibid. 171), and which has provided a successful way of handling both 
territorially fixed and non-territorial threats. To do so, the EU member states have agree to share 
or even give up some degree of territorial sovereignty. 
 
Unlike the territoriality of the EU, the four Common Spaces are not meant to make the EU or 
Russia give up territorial authority. As such, the exclusiveness provided by the principle of 
territorial sovereignty remains, as the EU and Russia are not enjoined by the objectives in the 
four Common Spaces. That is to say that the four Common Spaces are not binding to the EU or 
Russia in the same way as the EU member states are committed by regulations and directives. 
Nor are the four Common Spaces implying supranational institutions similar to the Commission 
in the EU. Yet, the four Common Spaces have the potential to provide the basis for the creation 
of common territoriality in some areas. Hence, free trade areas or visa-free regimes are both 
classifications by area. Likewise, such undertakings imply communication and enforcement of 
boundaries (cf. Sack’s definition of territoriality), which could establish some kind on common 
territoriality. However, for the EU and Russia to create a common territory based on common 
territoriality would necessitate sharing territorial authority, which seems just as unlikely as Russia 
gaining (or even applying for) membership of the EU. In stead, the four Common Spaces are 
more appropriately described as a territorial strategy of rapprochement, which stipulate 
coordination on internal/domestic matters and cooperation on common challenges. 
 
However, even though the four Common Spaces are recognising the fact that the traditional 
understanding of the territorial state is inadequate in terms of confronting many of the challenges 
in today’s geopolitical order, and that cross-border cooperation often is a mutual good, it appears 
that this has not meant a significant reorientation as to how territoriality is practised. Especially 
in the case of Kaliningrad this reorientation seems pertinent as Kaliningrad’s special status as 
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both Russian exclave and EU enclave underscores Anderson’s argument that sovereignty must 
be thought of in plural instead of singular as both the EU and Russia have competences 
regarding the territory of Kaliningrad (cf. chapter 3.1.). Therefore, the development in 
Kaliningrad is relying on rapprochement of the territorial strategies of two “external” actors – 
namely the EU and Russia – and in some cases it seems necessary to renounce the principle of 
sovereignty and work towards common territoriality, if Kaliningrad should profit by cooperation 
between the EU and Russia. 
 
5.3. Kaliningrad as a pilot region 
From the perspective of this study, it would make sense to make Kaliningrad a pilot region for 
cooperation between the EU and Russia within the framework of the four Common Spaces. 
First of all, a positive development in Kaliningrad is in the interest of both the EU and Russia, 
which is signified by the wide range of initiatives in Kaliningrad, and secondly, as it was argued in 
chapter 2.4, positive development in Kaliningrad depends on territorial alignment of the EU and 
Russia’s policies towards Kaliningrad. Finally, it has been argued that the four Common Spaces 
are designed to foster territorial rapprochement, and, bearing in mind that many of the initiatives 
in Kaliningrad are in accordance with the objectives defined in the four Common Spaces, 
Kaliningrad provides a suitable location to test the four Common Spaces.  
 
However, as not all of the objectives in the four Common Spaces are relevant for (or applicable 
in) Kaliningrad, Kaliningrad cannot be a pilot region for the entire framework provided by the 
four Common Spaces. Most notably, the Common Space on External Security is not relevant for 
Kaliningrad. Instead, this study suggests that Kaliningrad assumes the role as a pilot region for 
cooperation between the EU and Russia and that only certain parts of the four Common Spaces 
are implemented in Kaliningrad. This would first of all enable the EU and Russia to test the 
limits and potentials of parts of the cooperative framework and would also benefit the 
development in Kaliningrad, which is of mutual interest of the parties – including the people 
living in Kaliningrad. Below, I will put forward three proposals, which could be taken into 
consideration in order to make Kaliningrad a pilot region.  
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5.3.1. Russia’s Pilot Region 
If Kaliningrad is to be a pilot region for cooperation between the EU and Russia, it would be 
reasonable to follow the lines from Russia’s Medium Term Strategy from 1999, and make 
Kaliningrad Russia’s pilot region for cooperation with the EU. That is to say that Kaliningrad is 
first of all a part of the territory of Russia and thus encompassed by Russian territoriality – 
despite the physical detachment from the mainland. This means that initiatives concerning 
Kaliningrad as a general rule should be carried out under the auspices of the federal Russian 
authorities. This corresponds with one of President Putin’s main priorities, namely to ensure that 
the Russian regions do not adopt laws that challenge the federal laws.25 Furthermore, the four 
Common Spaces stipulate regulation of “internal” matters, which in the case of Kaliningrad 
primarily is dealt with by the Russian authorities as part of Kaliningrad’s exclativity.    
 
That is to say that a pilot region for cooperation would divide the Russian juridical space – 
depending on the degree of territorial rapprochement. Territorial rapprochement entails a less 
strict approach to sovereignty in order to create overlapping spaces and territorial inclusion. As 
such, if Russia recognised the beneficial consequences of giving up some degree of sovereignty 
many of the challenges faced in Kaliningrad could be solved by diverting from the traditional 
approach to territorial states – for example by deviating from the principle of reciprocity in the 
area of visa-regulations. In fact, the question about visa-free travel from the EU to Kaliningrad is 
not even a challenge. It should rather be seen as a potential, as it would have a positive impact on 
the economic development in Kaliningrad. As such, the proposal follows the approach in the 
four Common Spaces that increased cross-border contacts and cooperation is a common interest 
of mutual benefit, though the proposal in this context would, first and foremost, benefit the 
development in Kaliningrad.  
 
However, a pilot region for cooperation also means that the EU will have some degree of influence 
on the development in Kaliningrad. The EU should be allowed to exercise this influence as long 
as it is in cooperation with the Russian authorities. For this to happen, the federal Russian 
authorities must allow that the territory of Kaliningrad becomes less exclusive, which will not 
change the fact that Kaliningrad is – and will remain – a part of Russia. 
 
                                                 
25 I thank Lars Grønbjerg for pointing this out (Interview, April 19, 2006). 
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5.3.2. Preferential treatment 
As indicated above a pilot region for cooperation between the EU and Russia requires 
extraordinary measures and it would therefore be necessary to give Kaliningrad preferential 
treatment in some areas. That is to say that Kaliningrad should be recognised by both the EU 
and Russia as a special territory with special needs. For example the law on the SEZ is intended 
to create favourable conditions for economic operators in Kaliningrad, which is also the purpose 
of the Common Economic Space (CES) although the CES aims at improving economic 
conditions in both the EU and Russia. From the perspective of Kaliningrad, it would be logical to 
ensure correspondence between the SEZ and the CES in order to boost trade and thus the 
economic development in the region (i.e. Kaliningrad and the neighbouring countries). However, 
as it is now, the SEZ gives Kaliningrad a high degree of “openness” in terms of favourable 
import conditions (from the EU), whereas the flow in the reverse direction is considerably lower. 
That is to say that the full potential of the SEZ in Kaliningrad is yet to be realised since the 
export market (the EU) is not giving preferential treatment to Kaliningrad, such as easing the 
import restrictions on goods produced in Kaliningrad. Such an arrangement would of course – as 
pointed out by Stepanov (2003:32) – require some kind of control of origins of the goods, but 
would on the other hand have a great impact on Kaliningrad’s possibility of turning into a centre 
for EU-Russian trade relations and economic ties.  
 
Until now, the EU has rejected any kind of special trade regime for Kaliningrad by arguing that 
Kaliningrad is already enjoying the favourable conditions deriving from the EU enlargement (cf. 
Commission of the European Communities, 2001:2). Dewar furthermore points out that, from 
the perspective of the EU, a special trade regime can only be entered with sovereign states 
(Dewar, 2000:250-251). Therefore, it would (of course) be the federal Russian authorities who 
eventually should be the signatory on behalf of Kaliningrad, and the agreement would thus be 
entered with the sovereign Russia (cf. chapter 5.3.1.). The SEZ indicates that Russia is willing to 
give special privileges to Kaliningrad, which is why a special trade regime is realistic. Adding to 
this, Kaliningrad’s geographic isolation from mainland Russia would make such a regime 
relatively easy to administer. 
 
Likewise, the idea of a visa-free regime could very well be tested in the context of Kaliningrad if 
the proposal about visa-free travel from the EU to Kaliningrad could receive the necessary 
political support. This would benefit Kaliningrad’s social, economic and cultural links to the 
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neighbouring countries and thereby help to fulfil Kaliningrad’s potential as a location fostering 
territorial rapprochement between the EU and Russia, which is perfectly in accordance with the 
Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice. The advantages of such an agreement would 
first of all make Kaliningrad attractive as meeting place for EU and Russian business people, but 
– even more interesting – Kaliningrad could be promoted as the primary location for EU-
Russian conferences and summits (Swi cicki, 2004:21). The latter is not only profitable in terms 
of increased economic activity related to conferences and summits; it could also contribute to a 
more positive image of Kaliningrad as a “bridge-builder” between the EU and Russia. 
Furthermore, visa-free travel could – if not designed as a privilege only for diplomats and 
business people – foster human contacts between the EU and Russia. On a smaller scale, by 
adopting a special transit agreement concerning transportation of goods through Kaliningrad 
(similar to the FTD and the FRTD), it would be possible to benefit from the common road 
infrastructure (Pan-European Transport Network) in the Baltic Region. However, all of this will 
require that both the EU and Russia give Kaliningrad preferential treatment. 
 
5.3.3. A Common Agenda for Kaliningrad 
Above all, a pilot region for cooperation necessitate that the EU and Russia agree on a common 
agenda for the development in Kaliningrad. Nearly all of the initiatives in Kaliningrad described 
in chapter 4 mention cooperation between the EU as one of the main objectives. However, most 
of these are not implemented in a cooperative effort (with the exception of the NDEP and 
EuroFaculty), which means that the intention to foster cooperation often appears to be an obligatory 
“buzz-concept”. Therefore, the intention to foster cooperation should be pursued by agreeing on 
a common agenda, which defines the general common objectives for the development in 
Kaliningrad as well as the common means to implement the agenda.  
 
The wide variety of programs initiated in Kaliningrad is a clear sign of good intentions from both 
the EU and the federal Russian authorities as regards to the development in Kaliningrad. 
Obviously, the federal Russian authorities are not only interested in maintaining and enhancing 
the positive development in the oblast, they are also somewhat obligated as Kaliningrad is a part 
of Russia and encompassed by Russian territoriality and thus entitled to the existing federal 
subsidies and economic equalization mechanisms effective in Russia. The EU’s interest in 
Kaliningrad’s development is less evident as Kaliningrad is not a part of the EU and therefore not 
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affected by the internal affairs policies and structural funding in the EU (e.g. the European 
Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund etc.). Even so, Kaliningrad is still 
influenced by the territoriality of the EU, as argued previously, as well as the EU supports the 
development in Kaliningrad in various ways (primarily through TACIS funding). Hence, the 
development of a strategy for Kaliningrad should include both the EU and Russia as neither of 
the two can deal sufficiently with the Kaliningrad-question without the involvement of the other 
party. 
 
These efforts should be coordinated by adopting a common agenda for Kaliningrad specifying 
the overall objectives so that the expertise and financial resources are utilised. The regional 
authorities in Kaliningrad should also be involved in this process in order to ensure that any 
results provided by the pilot region first and foremost will benefit the region. For example, the 
extolled transit agreement from 2002 is not perceived by the citizens in Kaliningrad as a huge step 
forward in order to minimise the problems of isolation from the mainland – most notably 
regarding the transit of goods. In fact, from the perspective of the regional authorities, the single 
most important issue for Kaliningrad’s development in the future is the consequences for 
Kaliningrad when Lithuania and Poland join Schengen (supposedly in 2007), as this most likely 
will affect the transit of people and goods.26 Hence, there are not always conformity with what 
the regional authorities in Kaliningrad perceive as acceptable/desirable solutions to the problems 
they face and what diplomats in Brussels and Moscow think. Therefore, the active involvement 
of the regional authorities in any undertaking is a prerequisite so that the outcome of any 
agreement is benefiting Kaliningrad. Likewise, the various regional organisations operating in 
Kaliningrad (e.g. Nordic Council of Ministers, the CBSS etc.) should contribute to the agenda.  
 
So far, the most successful cooperative initiatives in Kaliningrad are within the field of 
environment and education. The Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership (NDEP) and 
the EuroFaculty has both done well in terms of fostering cooperation. Arguably, these initiatives 
are relatively small-scale, but they have nevertheless managed to set a common agenda for parts 
of the development in Kaliningrad and benefiting from cooperation between the EU (or, at least, 
EU member states) and Russia. The lessons learned from these initiatives as regards to 
cooperation should therefore be further explored and, if appropriate, be used in other contexts. 
 
                                                 
26 I thank Leonid Sergeev for drawing my attention to this concern (Interview, September 14, 2006). 
 - 66 -
All of this could very well be done within the framework of the new Northern Dimension 
Initiative (NDI), which is, as described in chapter 3.1.1, intended to be the regional expression of 
the four Common Spaces by including both Russian and EU stakeholders in solving common 
challenges. The NDI initially identified Kaliningrad as an area with particular needs, and this 
special focus is brought on to the new NDI. Furthermore, the NDI is characterised by involving 
local stakeholders in determining how to use the resources.  
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6. Conclusion 
 
 
Geography and politics are interrelated concepts, and Kaliningrad is a clear example of this. 
Kaliningrad contests the traditional understanding of territorial states as the primary (and 
sometimes the only) relevant actors. The constitutive feature of this approach is mutual 
exclusiveness (i.e. territorial sovereignty), which involves that legitimate domination of a 
territorially defined area is exercised without external interference. However, Kaliningrad 
illustrates that territories are not exclusive, as Kaliningrad is located “outside” the Russian 
mainland and “inside” the EU, and the development in Kaliningrad is therefore affected by 
territorial strategies of both parties. The purpose of this study has been to analyse how 
Kaliningrad’s two-dimensional dependence of “external powers” can be used to foster 
cooperation between the EU and Russia within the framework of four Common Spaces. Below, 
I will summarise the main conclusions of the analysis.  
 
The overall conclusion of this study is that Kaliningrad can become a pilot region for cooperation 
between the EU and Russia within the framework of the four Common Spaces. There are three 
primary reasons for this. First of all, both the EU and Russia share an interest in positive 
development and prosperity in Kaliningrad. The EU is primarily concerned with avoiding that 
non-territorial threats “outside” the EU will affect the situation “inside” the EU, and a 
prosperous Kaliningrad can help to avoid this. Russia’s interest in Kaliningrad is more obvious in 
the sense that Kaliningrad is a part of the Russian territory, which means that the development in 
Kaliningrad is an internal Russian matter. Altogether, the EU and Russia have a common interest 
in a positive development in Kaliningrad – although the parties’ interests are motivated by 
different rationales.  
 
Secondly, the development in Kaliningrad is depending on alignment of the EU and Russia’s 
territorial strategies in general and towards Kaliningrad in particular. Hence, it has been argued 
that Kaliningrad is a “clash of territorialities”, since the content of Kaliningrad’s exclativity is 
controlled by the federal Russian authorities, whereas the content of Kaliningrad’s enclativity is 
controlled by the EU. This means that Kaliningrad’s influence by “external powers” is two-
dimensional, and incongruity between the EU and Russia’s exercise of territorial influence affects 
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Kaliningrad negatively. Thus, positive development in Kaliningrad depends on alignment of 
territorial strategies of the EU and Russia. 
 
This leads us to the third and final reason for the conclusion. As this study has demonstrated the 
four Common Spaces between the EU and Russia can be characterised as a joint territorial 
rapprochement strategy designed to respond effectively to challenges, which the territorial state 
is inadequate in handling. As such, the four Common Spaces is an approach intended to create 
overlapping and inclusive spaces and thus avoid geopolitical dividing lines. Thus, the four 
Common Spaces’ objectives are very relevant for Kaliningrad, as these can contribute to 
overcome Kaliningrad’s inside-outside predicament. Furthermore, this study has shown that 
several of the objectives defined in the four Common Spaces are of great relevance to 
Kaliningrad and that many of these corresponds with existing initiatives in the region. The fact 
that the four Common Spaces is a joint initiative and designed to align the territoriality of the EU 
and Russia makes the four Common Spaces even more suitable for overcoming Kaliningrad’s 
inside-outside dilemma. 
 
In order to realise the idea of making Kaliningrad a pilot region, this study puts forward three 
propositions. 
 
• Kaliningrad should be Russia’s pilot region: Kaliningrad is a part of Russia and is 
accordingly encompassed by Russian territoriality and sovereignty. Therefore, 
cooperative undertakings cannot contradict with Russian federal laws. However, 
depending on the degree of cooperation and territorial rapprochement between the EU 
and Russia in Kaliningrad, Russia must be willing to adopt a less strict approach to 
sovereignty. 
 
• Kaliningrad should be given preferential treatment: The EU is currently viewing 
Kaliningrad as merely a part of Russia. In order to create a pilot region for cooperation it 
is necessary that the EU approaches Kaliningrad as a special part of Russia and agrees to 
give Kaliningrad special privileges in order to compensate for and invest in Kaliningrad’s 
special situation and unique location.  
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• The EU and Russia should agree on a common agenda for Kaliningrad: In order to 
utilise the resources spent in Kaliningrad, the EU and Russia should agree on a common 
agenda for the development in Kaliningrad. The new Northern Dimension Initiative, 
which is supposed to be the regional northern expression of the four Common Spaces, 
should be used in this context. Furthermore, local authorities in Kaliningrad as well as 
regional organisations operating in Kaliningrad should be included in this process. This 
will ensure that the agenda responds to the actual problems and potentials in Kaliningrad, 
and that the regional expertise is utilised. 
 
Currently, both the EU and Russia’s approach to the Kaliningrad-question are designed to 
compensate Kaliningrad for its geographical detachment from Russia. Instead, this study suggests 
that the EU and Russia invest in the benefits deriving from Kaliningrad’s geographical 
attachment to the EU by making Kaliningrad a pilot region for cooperation and that this is done 
within the framework of the four Common Spaces. This entails a more inclusive approach to 
territoriality, which will, however, be a significant step towards realising the EU and Russia’s 
objective about avoiding the creation of new dividing lines on the European continent. Most 
importantly, the lessons learned from the pilot region could help to “guide” and “lead” the 
implementation of the overall cooperative framework between the EU and Russia, as the 
experiences from Kaliningrad could reveal the obstacles and potentials for the realisation of the 
four Common Spaces. Kaliningrad would thus be turned into a laboratory for cooperation, and it 
is in this context Kaliningrad can become a common space for the EU and Russia. 
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This thesis explores the possibilities and barriers of making the Russian Baltic exclave, Kaliningrad, a “pilot region” for cooperation between the EU and Russia. By analysing Kaliningrad’s political-geographic status as both Russian exclave and EU enclave, it is 
argued that Kaliningrad is influenced by the territoriality of the EU as well as the territoriality of 
Russia, and that development in Kaliningrad is depending on alignment of the EU and Russia’s 
territorial strategies in general and towards Kaliningrad in particular. The analytical focus is 
then turned towards the EU and Russia’s overall cooperative framework – the so-called “four 
Common Spaces” – which lay down the guidelines for the EU and Russia’s long-term territorial 
rapprochement strategy in order to respond effectively to common territorial and non-territorial 
challenges. By analysing existing programs and initiatives in Kaliningrad and their connection to 
Kaliningrad’s territorial status in the EU-Russian relationship, it is argued that the development 
in Kaliningrad would benefit from being tied up to the framework of the “four Common Spaces”. 
This implies to agree on a new policy designed to invest in Kaliningrad’s “attachment” to the 
EU instead of compensating for Kaliningrad’s “detachment” from the Russian mainland. The 
thesis thus concludes that Kaliningrad can become a “pilot region” for cooperation between the 
EU and Russia within the framework of the “four Common Spaces”, and it is suggested: 1) 
that Kaliningrad becomes Russia’s “pilot region” so that Russian sovereignty is preserved; 2) that 
Kaliningrad is given preferential treatment, which take into account the region’s particular political 
and geographical situation and challenges; and 3) that the EU and Russia jointly agrees on an 
agenda, which defines the guidelines for the development in Kaliningrad. That way Kaliningrad 
can become a common space for the EU and Russia and lead the way for the overall cooperative 
framework between the EU and Russia.
